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OPEN THE JAIL CELL DOORS, HAL:
A GUARDED EMBRACE OF PRETRIAL
RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS
Glen J. Dalakian II*
In recent years, criminal justice reformers have focused their attention on
pretrial detention as a uniquely solvable contributor to the horrors of modern
mass incarceration. While reform of bail practices can take many forms, one
of the most pioneering and controversial techniques is the adoption of
actuarial models to inform pretrial decision-making. These models are
designed to supplement or replace the unpredictable and discriminatory
status quo of judicial discretion at arraignment. This Note argues that
policymakers should experiment with risk assessment instruments as a
component of their bail reform efforts, but only if appropriate safeguards are
in place.
Concerns for protecting individual constitutional rights, mitigating racial
disparities, and avoiding the drawbacks of machine learning are the key
challenges facing reformers and jurisdictions adopting pretrial risk
assessment instruments. Absent proper precautions, risk assessment
instruments can reinforce, rather than alleviate, modern criminal justice
disparities. Drawing from a case study of New Jersey’s recent bail reform
program, this Note examines the efficacy, impact, and pitfalls of risk
assessment instrument adoption. Finally, this Note offers a broad framework
for policymakers seeking to thoughtfully experiment with risk assessment
instruments in their own jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
“Sometimes you sit and you stare at the defendant, you get a sense that this
defendant is just going to take a hike.”1 A New York Supreme Court justice
made this startling comment about the defendant’s risk of flight when pressed
by a defense attorney to only consider New York’s nine required statutory

1. Transcript of Proceedings at 9, People v. [redacted] (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 11, 2017) (on
file with author). The author worked on this case while at the Legal Aid Society of New York.
The defendant’s name is redacted to protect their privacy.
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factors when setting bail.2 Such bold assertions about risk of flight—while
clearly unlawful—are appealable.3 This judge was at least forthcoming
about the proprietary black box of assumptions she uses to determine whether
a defendant would be a flight risk and, thus, incarcerated pretrial.4 Most
judges are less transparent. Although this particular judge happened to state
her lack of formal adherence to the statutory factors, she is by no means the
only judge to demonstrate this behavior. She is the norm. That is the nature
of judicial discretion—appointed or elected individuals are given the power
to fix bail,5 regardless of whether they are honest about or aware of their
reasoning.
Judges are entrusted to weigh various factors to issue a judgment and do
so through the lens of their own perceptions and implicit biases.6 If personal
intuition was not an expected part of the equation, then courts could simply
input the statutory factors into an algorithm and render a mechanical
judgment based on the actuarial outcome. Some believe that this is exactly
what should be done.7
Risk assessment instruments (RAIs) are gradually being implemented in
criminal justice systems8 across the United States to, in theory, more
efficiently render parole, sentencing, and bail decisions.9 At the bail stage,
before conviction or trial, this type of decision-making presents unique
challenges and opportunities for reform.10 Current racial disparities in the
incarcerated population, for example, can be maintained or worsened by such
modeling.11 While some of these concerns have been tested only at
sentencing,12 the increasing prevalence of such models throughout the
duration of an individual’s criminal justice experience offers revealing
insight into how policymakers and judges do, and should, implement
actuarial risk assessment tools.13

2. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2) (2018).
3. Indeed, this judge nearly dared the defense attorney to appeal the decision: “Let me
know what the Appellate Division does.” Transcript, supra note 1, at 13.
4. In New York, judges must determine a person’s risk of flight to set appropriate bail.
See id.
5. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 500.10(3) (2018).
6. See infra Part I.A.1. See generally Praatika Prasad, Note, Implicit Racial Biases in
Prosecutorial Summations: Proposing an Integrated Response, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091
(2018).
7. See infra Part I.B.3.
8. This Note uses “criminal justice systems” as a plural phrase to highlight the lack of
one overarching “system” in the United States. Criminal justice is mostly a local process
driven by small jurisdictions and their complex interactions. See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN:
THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 13 (2017)
(“A major barrier to reform . . . is the fractured nature of our criminal justice system. In fact,
there is no single ‘criminal justice system,’ but instead a vast patchwork of systems that vary
in almost every conceivable way.”).
9. See infra Part I.C (discussing these models).
10. See infra Part I.B.3.
11. See infra Part II.B.2.
12. See infra Part I.C.1.
13. See infra Parts II.C, III.A.
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To date, little is known about the maintenance or exacerbation of the
disparate impact such modeling can have on defendants.14 What is known is
that models are subject to human regulation and they can only analyze the
world as it exists today, blemishes and all.15 Many proprietary risk
assessment tools employ hidden algorithms subject only to the owner’s, or
sometimes the purchaser’s, oversight.16 However, judicial discretion is
always based on a black box of individual assumptions, biases, and
While
prejudices,17 even within a “strict” statutory framework.18
assumptions about the impact of risk assessment tools on economic and racial
disparities are prevalent,19 little scholarship has placed that criticism
alongside the only alternative: the status quo of judicial discretion.
The increased adoption of RAIs at multiple touchpoints in criminal justice
systems presents a host of novel challenges and opportunities for reform.20
With the goal of reducing the pretrial jail population,21 this Note offers
potential steps forward for criminal justice systems. Readers will hold
various opinions about how punitive, retributive, deterrent, incapacitative, or
rehabilitative criminal justice systems should be.22 In the pretrial context in
particular, before any finding of guilt, reduction of the incarcerated
population seems to better adhere to the well-known maxim and international
norm of “innocent until proven guilty.”23 Yet any proposed reforms will only
offer broad recommendations and theoretical frameworks rather than detailed
prescriptions for every local situation.
This Note explores the inequities in modern bail systems and analyzes one
of the most controversial options for reform: RAIs as opposed to judicial
discretion. Part I provides an overview of the functions and limitations of
judicial discretion and explains how current bail systems operate, drive mass
14. The Northpointe model, for example, offers a disappointing case study on racial
outcomes. See infra Part I.C.1.
15. See “Not in It for Justice”: How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System
Unfairly Punishes Poor People, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Not in It for
Justice],
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/04/11/not-it-justice/how-californias-pretrialdetention-and-bail-system-unfairly [https://perma.cc/YBX5-4YVG] (“Despite the veneer of
objectivity, the risk scores are subjectively defined and can be manipulated to direct fewer or
greater numbers of people into custody or under supervision, depending on the needs of those
administering the tools.”); see also infra Parts II.D.2, III.C.
16. Jason Tashea, Courts Are Using AI to Sentence Criminals. That Must Stop Now,
WIRED (Apr. 17, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/courts-using-ai-sentencecriminals-must-stop-now/ [https://perma.cc/CRK6-SH9A]; see also infra Part I.C.1.
17. See infra Part I.A.1. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009).
18. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (2018).
19. See Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment:
Constitutional and Ethical
Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 273 (2015) (discussing former Attorney General Eric
Holder’s warnings about RAI adoption).
20. See JOHN F. PFAFF, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 132 (2016). See generally
Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 569 (Ind. 2010).
21. See infra Parts I.B.2–3, III.A.
22. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 37.
23. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 459 (1895); see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A art.
11, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
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incarceration, and may be reformed. Part I also describes how actuarial risk
assessment models have taken shape over the past sixty years. Next, Part II
analyzes the potential pitfalls of RAI adoption, offers a case study from New
Jersey’s experience with RAIs, and describes how both judicial discretion
and RAIs respond to correction. Finally, Part III offers a sober-minded
acceptance of RAI adoption, with the caveat that the proper goals, factors,
and monitoring mechanisms must be in place.
I. INCARCERATED UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY
The United States’s incarceration record is abysmal.24 While myriad
errors, inequalities, and abuses plague federal and state criminal justice
systems, there is something particularly egregious about pretrial
incarceration. A deprivation of liberty based merely upon suspicion of
wrongdoing is legal, but subject to special constitutional and court-prescribed
protections.25 This Note focuses on reform of pretrial incarceration as a
uniquely solvable aspect of criminal justice inequality. Many policymakers
across the political spectrum are amenable to, if not outright supportive of,
bail reform.26 States have attempted reform with varying degrees of
success.27 There appears to be widespread consensus that reform is
necessary, but debate continues over what form it should take.28 One
increasingly popular approach is the adoption of actuarial risk assessment
tools.
To best understand the issues surrounding RAI adoption, Part I.A
discusses the ever-changing power and influence of judicial discretion,
affected by both individual judges’ own cognitive abilities and pressure from
other actors in criminal justice systems. Next, Part I.B offers an overview of
modern pretrial incarceration and explores bail systems and why reforms are
needed. Part I.C focuses on the development of one proposed pretrial reform:
actuarial risk assessment instruments.
A. The Ebb and Flow of Judicial Discretion
Judges have a special role in society: they are appointed or elected to
interpret, uphold, and enforce the law. The respect afforded to judges
enforces a system of deference and trust in those seated on the lofty bench.
Society places special reverence and power upon these individuals who are
considered to be in the best position to safeguard the rule of law. Yet, judges
are human, and thus imperfect. They are beholden to the influences of their
24. See infra Part I.B.2.
25. See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
26. See Kamala D. Harris & Rand Paul, Kamala Harris and Rand Paul: To Shrink Jails,
Let’s Reform Bail, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/
opinion/kamala-harris-and-rand-paul-lets-reform-bail.html [https://perma.cc/GCZ6-Y466].
27. See infra Part II.C; infra note 354 (discussing challenges in Kentucky’s adoption of
RAIs).
28. See Alan Feuer, New Jersey Is Front Line in a National Battle over Bail, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/nyregion/new-jersey-bail-reformlawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/3NX8-NMZN].
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environments and must balance respect for precedent against equitable
solutions for those before them. With limited information, they must decide
who is deprived of their liberty before trial, who is guilty of crime, what type
of punishment is necessary to carry out the policy goals of the legislature,
and how to balance a packed docket of cases, each of which demand full due
process. These practical limitations are only made worse by the
computational limitations of the brain.29
Judges have varying intelligence levels and experiences, which makes
broad analysis of their behavior impracticable and prone to error. Yet, these
idiosyncrasies alone are not enough to create skepticism about a judge’s
ability to dole out equal justice. In addition to a judge’s own cognitive
limitations, myriad guidelines, schedules, statutes, levels of prosecutorial
discretion, and other criminal justice processes influence their free decisionmaking. Politics also play a role because judges, particularly around election
times, are more likely to be “tough on crime” to avoid a newsworthy
reoffense by someone to whom they showed leniency.30 Part I.A.1 describes
the individual and cognitive factors which limit the computational abilities
of judges. Then, Part I.A.2 examines how competing actors in criminal
justice systems limit and influence judicial discretion.
1. The Bounds of Judicial Thought: Assumptions, Biases,
and Cognitive Limitations
When rendering decisions, judges consciously and subconsciously
combine their individual cognitive abilities with necessary assumptions,
imperfect information, and prejudices and biases developed throughout their
lives. Judges are further impacted by their educational and legal experiences,
which create a veritable black box of judicial decision-making that can be
just as unpredictable and opaque as any inscrutable RAI.31 Judicial
discretion is particularly influenced by implicit biases, which all people
carry.32
Studies have shown that judges discriminate against defendants on racial
grounds.33 While explicit racism undoubtedly “accounts for many of the
racial disparities in the criminal justice system,”34 implicit bias is perhaps
29. See infra Part I.A.1.
30. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 112; Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 417, 431 (2016) (“Faced with strong pressure to err on the side of detaining defendants
and bearing none of the costs of pretrial detention, judges are thus unlikely to act
independently to accomplish legislatures’ stated goals of limiting detention to very dangerous
defendants or those that pose high flight risks.”).
31. See infra Parts I.A.I, I.C.1.
32. Implicit bias is defined here as “stereotypical associations so subtle that people who
hold them might not even be aware of them.” See Rachlinski et al., supra note 17, at 1196.
33. See id. at 1225. Using the Implicit Association Test, researchers found: “First,
implicit biases are widespread among judges. Second, these biases can influence their
judgment. Finally, judges seem to be aware of the potential for bias in themselves and possess
the cognitive skills necessary to void its influence.” Id.
34. See id. at 1196 (“Researchers have found a marked decline in explicit bias over time,
even as disparities in outcomes persist.”).
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more insidious.35 For example, judges in Connecticut set bail amounts
“twenty-five percent higher for black defendants than for similarly situated
white defendants.”36 As this Note’s opening quote suggests, the line between
implicit and explicit bias can be thin, but both are evident in the bail context:
Hidden biases against the poor and minorities can easily creep into
[judicial] decision-making. And a growing body of evidence indicates that
the nation’s bail system keeps many low-risk defendants incarcerated
before trial, while those who may pose a higher risk are released because
they have the money to make bail.37

While little is known about the full impact RAIs can have on racial
disparities,38 model developers have at least avoided race as an explicit input
in most algorithms.39 However, many other factors are proven to track along
racial lines and to lead to racial disparities, whether considered in judicial
discretion or as model inputs.40
Beyond biases, human judgment is prone to outright error. Empirical
studies have identified several sources of error in judgment, including:
(1) ignoring or using incorrect base rates, (2) assigning suboptimal or
incorrect weights to information . . . , (3) failing to take into account
regression toward the mean, (4) failing to properly take into account
covariation, (5) relying on illusory correlations between predictor variables
and the criterion . . . , (6) failing to acknowledge the natural bias among
forensic examiners toward ‘conservative’ judgments . . . , and (7) failing to
receive, and thus benefit from, feedback on judgment errors.41

These sources of error are dangerous alone.42 And they are worse in
combination. In many ways, RAIs can mitigate the impact of such errors by
at least removing cognitive incapacities and the inability to see the fullest
picture available. Professors Eric Janus and Robert Prentky argue that “even
35. See id. at 1221 (“[O]ur data suggest that an invidious homunculus might reside in the
heads of most judges in the United States, with the potential to produce racially biased
distortions in the administration of justice.”). See generally Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty
by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 187 (2010).
36. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 17, at 1196.
37. Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES (June
26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-ascience.html [https://perma.cc/HXX9-7C2V].
38. See Sari Horwitz, Eric Holder: Basing Sentences on Data Analysis Could Prove
Unfair to Minorities, WASH. POST. (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/us-attorney-general-eric-holder-urges-against-data-analysis-in-criminalsentencing/2014/08/01/92d0f7ba-1990-11e4-85b6-c1451e622637_story.html
[https://perma.cc/5DZU-UW3T].
39. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/8BRV-3E35]; infra Part I.C.
40. See infra Part II.B.2.
41. See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment
with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443,
1457–58 (2003).
42. Consider that most judges, and “problem-solving courts,” cannot know the best way
to expertly address mental health or addiction issues. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 690–96.
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the weakest of the actuarial assessment methods appears to be systematically
better than clinical judgments.”43 While judges and human-developed
algorithms can never have complete information about a defendant,
algorithms are undoubtedly better at analyzing the available information
consistently and accurately.44
2. Nonjudicial Discretion
Although the preceding section presented judicial discretion as a uniform
block with singular limitations, in reality a judge’s level of discretion varies
across jurisdictions. While that discretion may be outlined clearly via statute,
it is also informally subject to the tug-of-war between actors across criminal
justice systems.45 Police and prosecutors name the charges against a
defendant, defense attorneys bargain to limit client exposure to punishment,
governors and state attorneys general influence statewide attitudes toward
punitiveness and criminal justice culture, parole boards and officers impact
actual time served, and sentencing commissions develop guidelines and
policies to limit discretion.46 Judicial discretion operates in the remaining
space. This push and pull is most evident, however, in the relationship
between prosecutors and judges.47
Legislative and guideline-based changes to sentencing regimes have
greatly expanded the discretion of prosecutors who “effectively determine
the guideline sentence by choosing what charges to file.”48 This same power
dynamic can affect the statutory factors judges consider when setting bail, in
particular the possible sentence if convicted and the strength of the
evidence.49 While judicial discretion does change over time, judges
generally have greater discretion in the bail context than in sentencing.50
Before trial, judicial discretion is at its height.51 While levels of discretion
vary, this Note will view judicial discretion as pure in its absolute power over
bail determinations at arraignment in order to compare it to the actuarial
alternative.
B. Fixing Bail
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “[i]n our society liberty is the norm,
and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
43. See Janus & Prentky, supra note 41, at 1458.
44. See id.
45. See generally PFAFF, supra note 20, ch. 3.
46. Id.
47. See generally PFAFF, supra note 8, ch. 5.
48. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 112.
49. These are two bail determination factors used in New York. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 510.30 (2018).
50. However, bail schedules reflect the power of legislatures and boards to rein in judicial
discretion, relative to prosecutors who bring charges against a defendant. Still, judges
typically remain the main actor in setting bail.
51. In New Jersey, for example, a 2014 constitutional amendment gave judges very broad
discretion to order pretrial detention with limited restrictions. See infra Part II.C.
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exception.”52 Upon arrest, courts determine whether an individual will be
released unconditionally, whether he will be released subject to conditions—
such as bail, supervised release, or other programs—or whether he will be
remanded to jail before trial.53 When a person is conditionally released, bail
has historically been employed as a mechanism to prevent an undue
deprivation of liberty, while ensuring a person does not flee a jurisdiction’s
reach or pose a real danger to the community.54 Contrary to what the Eighth
Amendment might suggest, there is no federal “right to bail,” but there is a
“right to liberty.”55 The Eighth Amendment enshrines bail as a legitimate
tool for maintaining an accused individual’s liberty for a price, while
simultaneously protecting people from bail that is “excessive.”56 What
constitutes “excessive bail” is up for interpretation.
Many state constitutions go a step further than the U.S. Constitution by
creating an affirmative right to bail. A typical state provision reads: “all
persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses,
where the proof is evident, or the presumption great.”57 This provision has
varying state interpretations, including giving different weights to the word
“shall” or granting unfettered judicial discretion in bail determinations
outside of capital offenses.58 Nine state constitutions simply mirror the
language of the U.S. Constitution and protect only the right to freedom from
excessive bail.59
The right to liberty is supposed to be constitutionally protected in the
pretrial arena.60 While the Eighth Amendment prevents excessive bail, it
does not define the word “excessive,” nor does it explain when bail should
or should not be fixed.61 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, described

52. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“We hold that the provisions for
pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited exception.”).
53. Moving Beyond Money: A Primer on Bail Reform, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM
HARV. L. SCH. 5 (Oct. 2016) [hereinafter Moving Beyond Money],
http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-on-Bail-Reform.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9KN4-JYZG].
54. Id.
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
56. Id. “Excessive” might even mean bail that someone simply cannot afford. See Marie
Solis, The Justice Department Says It’s Unconstitutional to Jail People Who Can’t Afford
Bail, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2016, 8:22 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/dojunconstitutional-to-jail-people-who-cant-afford-bail-2016-8 [https://perma.cc/C7QD-KYAT]
(“Fixed bail schedules that allow for the pretrial release of only those who can pay, without
accounting for the ability to pay, unlawfully discriminate based on indigence.”).
57. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 9.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 8. The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable seizures,
guaranteeing that a defendant receives a probable cause determination by a neutral magistrate
within forty-eight hours of arrest. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–
57 (1991). This right has given rise to the concept of “individualized suspicion,” the apparent
lack of which is a major criticism leveled against actuarial risk assessment models. See Tracey
Maclin, The Pringle Case’s New Notion of Probable Cause: An Assault on Di Re and the
Fourth Amendment, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 395, 41012.
61. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 8.
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excessive bail in Stack v. Boyle62 as “[b]ail set at a figure higher than an
amount reasonably calculated” to assure the presence of the defendant at
trial.63 This tenuous calculus suggests that the Eighth Amendment calls for
a “sliding scale, linking constitutionally permissible bond amounts (or other
conditions of release) to the amount needed to incentivize particular
defendants to appear at court proceedings.”64
Following Stack, however, courts have rarely exercised any serious
restraint when setting bail.65 To best address the discriminatory and arguably
unconstitutional status quo, it is first important to understand how bail
decisions are made across criminal justice systems—a process outlined in
Part I.B.1. Then, Part I.B.2 describes how current bail systems have
contributed to the growing jail population in the United States. Part I.B.3
explains why reform is needed.
1. How Judges Make Bail Decisions
Judges across the country are directed to set bail to meet varying statutory
goals. State legislatures often stipulate several factors for judges to consider
when evaluating whether to set bail and in what amount. These factors can
include the person’s character, community ties, criminal record, past court
appearances, the weight of the evidence, the likely sentence if convicted, and
financial resources.66 Judges have discretion to make bail determinations, or
“fix bail,” using these factors.67 In New York, for example, judges are
required to set at least two of nine total possible types of bail.68 The most
popular types are money bail and insurance company bail bonds.69 However,
these types of bail are the most onerous, especially for people without
financial resources.70 They are also the most discriminatory because those

62. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
63. Id. at 5.
64. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 8 (endnote omitted).
65. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 53; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987);
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 546 (1952) (“[T]he very language of the [Eighth]
Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable.”).
66. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270.1 (2018); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (2018).
67. As demonstrated by this Note’s opening quote, some judges unpredictably pick and
choose which factors to consider or ignore. See supra text accompanying note 1.
68. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10 (2018) (listing permissible bail types: (1) cash bail,
(2) insurance company bail bond, (3) secured surety bond, (4) secured appearance bond,
(5) partially secured surety bond, (6) partially secured appearance bond, (7) unsecured surety
bond, (8) unsecured appearance bond, and (9) credit card or similar device).
69. These bonds are issued by bondsmen for a fee and sufficient collateral. Bondsmen
organizations across the country lobby heavily for the continued use of insurance company
bail bonds. See Feuer, supra note 28.
70. INSHA RAHMAN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, AGAINST THE ODDS: EXPERIMENTING WITH
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BAIL IN NEW YORK CITY’S CRIMINAL COURTS 2 (2017),
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/against-the-oddsbail-reform-new-york-city-criminal-courts/legacy_downloads/Against_the_Odds_Bail
_report_FINAL3.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WDG-T7EV].
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with means can pay their way out of pretrial detention, while others are
deprived of their fundamental liberty merely due to a lack of finances.71
Typically, state jurisdictions embrace one of two reasons to set bail: to
prevent risk of flight or to mitigate danger to the community.72 The federal
Bail Reform Act of 1966 prohibited courts from needlessly detaining
defendants accused of federal crime before trial unless there was a legitimate
risk of flight.73 The Act also blocked courts from considering danger to the
community when setting bail, except in capital offense cases.74 In 1984,
however, Congress replaced the 1966 Act and expanded the use of
community danger as a legitimate consideration.75 The Supreme Court
upheld this expansion in United States v. Salerno,76 stating:
Congress did not formulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment
for dangerous individuals. Congress instead perceived pretrial detention as
a potential solution to a pressing societal problem. There is no doubt that
preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal.77

Determining whether an individual is dangerous to the community is subject
to the whims of judicial discretion,78 although some states have further
limited bail determinations to solely considering risk of flight.79
Some jurisdictions—both state and local—also set mandatory or advisory
bail schedules, which attribute certain bail amounts to different crimes in an
effort to avoid the discrimination and lack of uniformity that comes with
judicial discretion.80 However, these schedules are premised on the false
assumption that the arrested individual actually committed the alleged
activity, an assumption that gives great power to prosecutors. They weaken
judicial discretion, which can take a person’s idiosyncrasies into account, for
better or worse. Yet, some judicial discretion makes sense.81 No person or
case is identical, and it takes a discerning mind to identify and weigh varying
material factors to prevent an unnecessary deprivation of liberty within
statutory goals.82
Rigid guidelines for pretrial detention leave great power in the hands of
the police and prosecutors who arrest and charge individuals prior to an
adversarial hearing.83 Judges are trusted with sifting through the limited
information gathered upon arrest, and within the accused individual’s
71. Wiseman, supra note 30, at 419.
72. See Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 14.
73. See Timothy R. Schnacke et al., The History of Bail and Pretrial Release, PRETRIAL
JUST. INST. 12 (Sept. 23, 2010), https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ccjj/Committees/BailSub/
Handouts/HistoryofBail-Pre-TrialRelease-PJI_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4MF-BBBG].
74. Id.
75. Id. at 17.
76. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
77. Id. at 747 (citations omitted).
78. See infra Part I.A.
79. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(vi) (2018).
80. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 11.
81. See infra Part III.C.
82. See Part I.A.
83. See infra Part I.A.2.
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history, to assess the risk of flight or danger to society the person poses.84
While judicial discretion offers some benefits of “individualized assessment”
through a holistic view of an arrested person’s situation,85 it remains rife with
error and implicit bias and contributes to the steep rise in the incarcerated
population.86
2. Bail as a Driver of Mass Incarceration
The United States has the largest rate of imprisonment in the world: 655
incarcerated for every 100,000 people.87 Representing merely 5 percent of
the world’s population, the United States has over 20 percent of the global
incarcerated population in its jails and prisons.88 Mass incarceration as a
political topic and national challenge is perhaps more popular now than in
any other time in American history.89 Bipartisan proposals have been put
forth to curb the size of the nation’s prison and jail populations.90
Yet, it is important to analyze prisons and jails separately.91 In the United
States, the main difference between prisons and jails is that those in prison
remain there for longer periods of time, whereas jails churn people in and out
at a much faster pace.92 Prisons typically hold those convicted of felonies
with sentences of over one year, while jails are supposed to imprison people
convicted of crimes (typically misdemeanors) with sentences of a year or
less.93 Unfortunately, a majority of the national jail population is made up
of those who have been incarcerated before trial without any sort of
conviction or final disposition of their case.94 Between 2000 and 2014, “95%
of the growth in the overall jail inmate population (123,500) was due to the

84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275(a) (2018); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30.
85. See infra Part II.A.
86. See infra Part I.B.2.
87. World Prison Brief: Highest to Lowest—Prison Population Rate, INST. FOR CRIM.
POL’Y
RES.,
http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate?
field_region_taxonomy_tid=All [https://perma.cc/F5ZQ-52KS] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
88. See id.
89. See, e.g., PFAFF, supra note 8, at 8–13.
90. See Harris & Paul, supra note 26.
91. Specifically, this Note will focus on state systems, rather than the federal criminal
justice system. It will further focus on state and local jail populations. Jail populations, which
are ever changing, are estimated to be far greater than the national prison population in any
given year. See PFAFF, supra note 8, at 2.
92. See, e.g., id. at 2.
93. FAQ Detail, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=322
[https://perma.cc/7SP2-6X3B] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). However, this was not always the
case. See, e.g., Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Rikers Island
for 3 Years Without Trial, Commits Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/nyregion/kalief-browder-held-at-rikers-island-for-3years-without-trial-commits-suicide.html [https://perma.cc/W53M-SMUY].
94. See Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2017,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2017.html
[https://perma.cc/P8ZZ-B4WE].
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increase in the unconvicted population (117,700 inmates).”95 In 2014,
approximately twelve million people passed through county jails.96 The
Prison Policy Initiative has estimated that of the expected 630,000 adults in
local jails across the United States on any given day in 2017, 443,000, or 70
percent, of them were not convicted of any crime.97
This Note focuses on the massive incarcerated population that exists due
to pretrial detention in jails, rather than the broader issue of prison population
growth in the United States. In jail complexes, such as Rikers Island in New
York City, pretrial detention remains one of the largest barriers to reducing
the incarcerated population. “Three-quarters of the jail population in New
York City consists of people who are being held while their cases are
awaiting an outcome in court. . . . In nearly all of these cases, the individuals
are held due to their inability to make bail.”98 To address the issue of
crowded jails and bloated pretrial incarceration, particularly for poor people
and people of color, some have called for the use of actuarial tools that train
criminological expertise toward a fairer bail allocation system99 by reducing
human error and bias.100 Yet, these efforts have been met with
counterarguments focused on the discriminatory potential and constitutional
concerns that arise when a state replaces judicial discretion with data-based
decision-making.101
Contact with criminal justice systems inevitably leads to cumulative
disadvantage.102 This phenomenon occurs “when prior negative events . . .
increase the likelihood of later negative events.”103 After arrest, pretrial
95. TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT
MIDYEAR 2014, at 4 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2Y42-3TUC].
96. See, e.g., PFAFF, supra note 8, at 2.
97. See Wagner & Rabuy, supra note 94.
98. INDEP. COMM’N ON N.Y. CRIMINAL JUSTICE & INCARCERATION REFORM, A MORE JUST
NEW
YORK
CITY
25
(2017),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
577d72ee2e69cfa9dd2b7a5e/t/58e0d7c08419c29a7b1f2da8/1491130312339/Independent+C
ommission+Final+Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/77Q3-ZGBQ].
99. Wiseman, supra note 30, at 433.
100. See supra Part I.A.
101. Angwin, supra note 39; see also infra Part II.B. See generally Hamilton, supra note
19.
102. This is particularly true for communities of color. See Cassia Spohn, Race, Sex, and
Pretrial Detention in Federal Court: Indirect Effects and Cumulative Disadvantage,
57 U. KAN. L. REV. 879, 881 (2009) (“If black offenders . . . are more likely than white
offenders . . . to be held in custody at the time of sentencing, and if pretrial custody results in
longer sentences for offenders generally, the ‘detention penalty’ will be greater [for black
defendants].”); John Wooldredge et al., Is the Impact of Cumulative Disadvantage on
Sentencing Greater for Black Defendants?, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 187, 217 (2015);
see also Besiki L. Kutateladze et al., Cumulative Disadvantage: Examining Racial and Ethnic
Disparity in Prosecution and Sentencing, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 514, 532 (2014).
103. William Y. Chin, Racial Cumulative Disadvantage: The Cumulative Effects of Racial
Bias at Multiple Touchpoints in the Criminal Justice System, 6 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y
441, 441 (2016); see also Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating
Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1973 (2005) (“The personal costs of detention
range from the demoralization effects of being placed in alien surroundings, cut off from
friends and family, to the financial costs of loss of work, to the loss of reputation and self-
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incarceration sets the stage for the rest of a person’s contact with criminal
justice systems, demonstrating why it is so important to get pretrial criminal
justice exposure right.
Beyond the psychological and physical harms that jail imposes upon a
person, an incarcerated individual can lose their job, housing, important
personal connections, and many other tangible and intangible
opportunities.104 These effects are particularly problematic before trial,
when a person is merely alleged to have committed a crime, rather than
convicted and sentenced to a prison term with all its attendant social stigma
and collateral consequences.105 Pretrial imprisonment often also causes
people to plead guilty simply to get out of jail.106 When a defendant is
acquitted or his case is dismissed, there is no restitution for the losses he
suffered while he was incarcerated before trial.107 This is why a presumption
of release is so critical108 and why reforming bail is so important to
individuals. An arraignment, where bail is determined, sets the stage for the
remainder of a person’s interaction with criminal justice systems and leads
to the snowballing of cumulative ill effects. On a large scale, incarceration
produces so many more devastating effects than simply incapacitating
individuals.109
3. Bail Reform
As hundreds of thousands of people languish in jail without a criminal
conviction,110 it is worth asking whether the adage “innocent until proven
guilty” is at all accurate in the United States today.111 Reformers across the
esteem.”); Marian R. Williams, The Effect of Pretrial Detention on Imprisonment Decisions,
28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 299, 312–13 (2003) (finding that pretrial detention was the strongest
predictor of subsequent incarceration and longer sentences compared with variables like race,
gender, and prior felony convictions); Deema Nagib, Note, Jail Isolation After Kingsley:
Abolishing Solitary Confinement at the Intersection of Pretrial Incarceration and Emerging
Adulthood, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2915, 2946 (2017) (discussing the particular ill effects of
pretrial incarceration on emerging adults).
104. Adam Neufeld, In Defense of Risk-Assessment Tools, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 22,
2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/10/22/in-defense-of-risk-assessment-tools
[https://perma.cc/3MZA-G9DV]. See generally Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial
Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned
Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201 (2018).
105. See Neufeld, supra note 104. See generally Dobbie et al., supra note 104.
106. Neufeld, supra note 104.
107. Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and some state
constitutions, states have sovereign immunity from such mistakes. See Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 733 (1999). See generally Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
108. See infra Part III.A.
109. Tony N. Brown & Evelyn Patterson, Wounds from Incarceration That Never Heal,
NEW REPUBLIC (June 28, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/134712/woundsincarceration-never-heal [https://perma.cc/SM9V-K9AQ].
110. See supra Part I.B.2.
111. Jaime Hawk, No Money, No Freedom: The Need for Bail Reform, ACLU WASH. 2
(2016), https://www.aclu-wa.org/sites/default/files/media-legacy/attachments/Bail%20
Position%20Paper%2C%20Final%20II.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H668-AMX2]
(“Current
practices that force people to stay in jail before their trial are contrary to the fundamental
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political spectrum have offered proposals to address bail systems’
contributions to the high rate of incarceration in the United States.112 These
efforts include altering the statutory factors judges consider when fixing
bail,113 ending cash or money bail entirely,114 expanding electronic
monitoring programs,115 replacing bail with supervised release or
rehabilitative programs,116 financing bail funds to pay small bail amounts for
those accused of low-level crimes,117 and supplementing or replacing judicial
bail decision-making with RAIs.118
The end of money bail is perhaps the most popular proposal.119 While
jurisdictions offer varying types of bail options, money bail is considered the
most onerous.120 To afford steep bail amounts, many defendants must turn
to bail bondsmen who pay the full bail amount for a nonrefundable fee.
Bondsmen usually demand collateral of at least 10 percent of the total bail
amount to secure the bond.121 This combined fee and collateral amount can
be burdensome for individuals who are already hard-pressed for cash. The
real injustice here is that wealthy people can pay their way to liberty while
indigent defendants are forced to spend a relatively great sum to contract with
a bondsman or remain in jail.
To combat this money-bail inequity, nonprofits in jurisdictions including
New York City have supported the launch of bail funds that will pay small
American principle that one is innocent until proven guilty. Accused people who can’t afford
bail are instead treated as if they have already been tried and convicted.”).
112. Harris & Paul, supra note 26.
113. Curtis E. A. Karnow, Setting Bail for Public Safety, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 2
(2008).
114. Innocence Staff, Video: Tell California Lawmakers to End Money Bail, INNOCENCE
PROJECT (May 4, 2017), https://www.innocenceproject.org/video-tell-california-lawmakersend-money-bail/ [https://perma.cc/4MMU-AWKV]; see also Cherise Fanno Burdeen, The
Dangerous Domino Effect of Not Making Bail, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/the-dangerous-domino-effect-of-notmaking-bail/477906/ [https://perma.cc/WN2S-D3A7]; Jamiles Lartey, New Legislation
Encourages States to End Discriminatory ‘Money Bail’ Practice, GUARDIAN (July 20, 2017,
14:42), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jul/20/bail-reform-legislation-moneybail-incarceration-us-jail [https://perma.cc/M2AC-3E2H].
115. See Electronic Monitoring: Proceed with Caution, PRETRIAL JUST. INST.: THE
PRETRIAL BLOG 12 (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.pretrial.org/electronic-monitoring-proceedcaution/ [https://perma.cc/C9QC-MLR3].
116. See generally id.
117. Alysia Santo, Bail Reformers Aren’t Waiting for Bail Reform, MARSHALL PROJECT
(Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/08/23/bail-reformers-aren-twaiting-for-bail-reform [https://perma.cc/N8KJ-5GWC].
118. Cindy Redcross et al., New York City’s Pretrial Supervised Release Program, VERA
INST. JUST. (Apr. 2017), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/
Publications/new-york-citys-pretrial-supervised-release-program/legacy_downloads/
Supervised-Release-Brief-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/LV2N-MHWG].
119. Udi Ofer, We Can’t End Mass Incarceration Without Ending Money Bail, ACLU
(Dec. 11, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/we-cant-end-massincarceration-without-ending-money-bail [https://perma.cc/M5HT-3W5X].
120. See RAHMAN, supra note 70, at 4.
121. See Insha Rahman, Chipping Away at New York City’s Unjust and Misguided Bail
System, VERA INST. JUST. (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.vera.org/blog/chipping-away-at-newyork-citys-unjust-and-misguided-bail-system [https://perma.cc/YLP4-DQBM].
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bail amounts for a person who meets certain criteria, like only being accused
of a misdemeanor with bail set under a specified maximum.122 New Jersey
has reformed its pretrial system by ending money bail altogether and
adopting risk assessment tools with a presumption of release for many
defendants, which effectively destroyed the local bail bonds industry.123
Reformers continue to debate the efficacy of certain reform options, but RAI
adoption has proven particularly controversial.
C. The Rise of Risk Assessment Instruments
The adoption of risk assessment instruments is a contested option for bail
reform.124 Modern risk assessment tools are the product of decades of
criminal justice debates, philosophical shifts, and experimentation.125 When
rehabilitation became the focus of criminal justice in the late nineteenth
century,126 individuals began to be given unique individualized sentences
and treatments “to prepare them for safe reentry into society.”127
Simultaneously, judges were given great discretion in sentencing.128 Reform
efforts in the 1970s and 1980s, however, caused a shift toward more
retributive goals of criminal justice to theoretically provide more
predictability and equal treatment to all defendants.129 Due to this
overcorrection, which led to increased levels of incarceration, evidencebased practices (EBPs) were introduced to use empirical analyses to inform
sentencing decisions and outcomes.130 This strategy was hailed by some as
a “constructive middle ground” between rehabilitation and retributivism.131
EBP has fueled the modern evolution of risk assessment tools.132 These
mechanisms assess the relationship between dynamic and static risk factors
and offer a score based on a preset algorithm.133 Dynamic factors can change
over time, including current age, employment status, and current medical or
rehabilitation treatment programs.134 Static factors, conversely, are
unchangeable and cannot be targeted for treatment, such as criminal history,
122. See, e.g., BROOK. COMMUNITY BAIL FUND, https://brooklynbailfund.org/
[https://perma.cc/YJ66-EQES] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
123. See infra Part II.C.
124. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 19.
125. Id.
126. A rehabilitative focus dominated criminal justice discussions until the 1970s,
emphasizing punishment based on an individual’s characteristics rather than just the crimes
that they committed. See Danielle Kehl et al., Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System:
Assessing the Use of Risk Assessment in Sentencing (unpublished paper, Harvard Law
School), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33746041/2017-07_responsive
communities_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW58-KYZK].
127. Id.
128. Id. (stating that this led to disproportionate sentencing of racial minorities).
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id.; see also Richard E. Redding, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Science of
Sentencing Policy and Practice, 1 CHAP. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 3–4 (2009).
131. Kehl et al., supra note 126, at 8.
132. See id. (discussing four “generations” of risk assessment development in sentencing).
133. Id. at 9.
134. Id.
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age at first arrest, and gender.135 Risk assessment tools today often embrace
both types of factors, with varying results.136 Unarguably, modern risk
assessment tools are more advanced and pervasive than the basic tools used
to generate parole decisions in the 1920s.137 Modern tools often employ
machine learning in their algorithms to inform models that are based on big
data sets.138 Models have been widely used in the parole and sentencing
contexts.139 There is also a growing trend toward modifying actuarial models
to improve pretrial detention outcomes, which tend to focus on static risk
factors.140
Some states do not employ risk assessments at all, and other states, like
New York, offer judges a risk score with a full breakdown of factors, which
they are free to ignore. Still other states, like New Jersey, are increasing the
importance of risk assessment tools, making them one of the most influential
factors in a judge’s decision.141 In the latter circumstance, some judges may
look at the risk scores and little else.142 There are generally two types of
pretrial risk assessment mechanisms in use: “clinical tools, which rely on
specialists within the court system . . . to exercise judgment, and actuarial
risk assessment instruments, which generate risk scores based on statistical
analysis.”143 This Note focuses on the latter and assesses whether actuarial
models are in fact useful tools for courts to employ before trial.
In a meta-analysis related to the use of actuarial risk assessment tools to
assess sex offender reoffending, Janus and Prentky explain that clinical
prediction was superior to actuarial prediction in only 8 out of 136 studies,
whereas actuarial models were comparable or superior to clinical prediction
in the remaining 128 studies.144 The focus of these studies was on
recidivism—a back-end metric145—but the same limitations of clinical
inaccuracy should hold true for front-end processes, such as pretrial
detention. Another working paper by the National Bureau of Economic
135. Id.
136. See infra Part I.C.
137. Id.; see also Richard A. Berk & Justin Bleich, Statistical Procedures for Forecasting
Criminal Behavior: A Comparative Assessment, 12 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 (2013);
Howard G. Borden, Factors for Predicting Parole Success, 19 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
328, 328–36 (1928).
138. See Exec. Office of the President, Big Data: A Report on Algorithmic Systems,
Opportunity,
and
Civil
Rights,
WHITE
HOUSE
8–10
(May
2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2016_0504_data_di
scrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C2W-DLAF]; see also infra Part II.B.4.
139. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 18.
140. Id. at 22.
141. See infra Part II.C.
142. Letter from John Raphling, Senior Researcher, Human Rights Watch, to Alexis
Wilson Briggs, Dir. of Research & Dev., Katal Ctr. for Health, Equity & Justice, and Alec
Karakatsanis, Founder & Exec. Dir., Civil Rights Corps (July 17, 2017),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/17/human-rights-watch-advises-against-using-profilebased-risk-assessment-bail-reform [https://perma.cc/FQ5B-GHNC].
143. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 18; see also PFAFF, supra note 20, at 132.
144. See Janus & Prentky, supra note 41, at 1456 (“Actuarial prediction was found to be
superior in 33% to 47% of the studies.”).
145. See infra Part II.B.3.
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Research examined simulations of RAIs using New York City arrest data
between 2008 and 2013 and found that “crime could be reduced by nearly a
quarter with no change in jailing rates, and the number of people detained in
jails could be reduced by 42 percent with no increase in the crime rate.”146
But such tools can only be successful if the people creating them tune them
for the right usage.147
RAIs have been implemented across state jurisdictions, such as Kentucky,
New Jersey, and Arizona, as well as for certain federal crimes.148 These
actuarial regimes are created for government use by both non- and for-profit
organizations.149 Some reformers have embraced RAIs to “ensure greater
fairness and efficacy in pretrial justice,”150 especially compared to inelastic
bail schedules or judicial whims.151 New Jersey has specifically used the
expected efficiency of RAIs as a justification for ending discriminatory
money-bail systems statewide.152
While often idealized as a fairer and more equitable option for bail
determination, these models have also been met with skepticism by actors
across the criminal justice process—even those who want to abolish cash bail
cannot agree on how to remedy the system.153 Implementation can be
difficult as adversaries across the political spectrum dig into tough-on-crime
dogmatism154 or fear-based aversion.155 These efforts have also been met
with legal challenges and have generated varying results.156 Yet, adopting
such models can undoubtedly be transformative—for better or worse—and

146. Dan Rosenblum, The Fight to Make New York City’s Complex Algorithmic Math
Public, CITY & ST. N.Y. (Nov. 21, 2017), http://cityandstateny.com/articles/politics/newyork-city/making-new-york-city-algorithms-public.html [https://perma.cc/EQ4Z-ZNTT].
147. See infra Parts II.B.3, III.A.
148. Pretrial Justice, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/
initiative/criminal-justice/pretrial-justice/ [https://perma.cc/LE29-UAWQ] (last visited Aug.
24, 2018); see also Wiseman, supra note 30, at 442 n.145.
149. See, e.g., Case Management for Supervision, EQUIVANT, http://www.equivant.com/
solutions/case-management-for-supervision [https://perma.cc/KB6Q-JHNE] (last visited
Aug. 24, 2018); The Colorado Pretrial Assessment Tool (CPAT), COLO. ASS’N PRETRIAL
SERVICES
(2015),
http://capscolorado.org/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/
CPAT_Manual_V21_06-29-2015.179175025.pdf [https://perma.cc/C34L-5TUX].
150. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 20.
151. See supra Part I.A.
152. Supra Part I.A.; see infra Part II.C.
153. See Teresa Mathew, Why New York City Created Its Own Fund to Bail People Out of
Jail, CITYLAB (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/12/nyc-bailfund/546155/ [https://perma.cc/YY33-GVQ4] (“Politicians tend to be in favor of using riskassessment tools, a method that has nearly eliminated cash bail in New Jersey. Many activists,
on the other hand, believe those tools are flawed and biased against poorer communities of
color.”) .
154. Beth Schwartzapfel & Bill Keller, Willie Horton Revisited, MARSHALL PROJECT (May
13,
2015),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie-horton-revisited
[https://perma.cc/N86V-RCQP].
155. Letter from 5 Boro Defs. et al. to Andrew Cuomo, Governor, N.Y. State (Nov. 2017),
https://www.politico.com/states/f/?id=0000015f-c1db-d7af-a9df-c3fbebb00000
[https://perma.cc/9XPX-LFME].
156. See generally State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
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present a host of practical, discriminatory, and constitutional questions.157
These challenges, however, do not eclipse the need for reform nor the
potential that RAIs offer for improved pretrial dispositions.158 Reform,
through the use of RAIs, demands that policymakers carefully consider
(1) what goals the model seeks to achieve,159 (2) who creates the model,160
and (3) what factors the model includes.161
1. Proprietary and For-Profit Models
While rarely used before trial, for-profit risk assessment tools present a
number of challenges for adopting jurisdictions. The Correctional Offender
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) RAI is the
leading for-profit tool, developed by Northpointe, Inc.162 This suite of
proprietary algorithms is closed from public view and legislative review.163
While COMPAS has different iterations for varying aspects of the criminal
justice system, it is most famously used to predict recidivism.164 In 2016,
ProPublica released a critical study of the tool’s racial outcomes, which
found that “black defendants were far more likely than white defendants to
be incorrectly judged to be at a higher risk of recidivism, while white
defendants were more likely than black defendants to be incorrectly flagged
as low risk.”165 While Northpointe’s software is one of the most widely
adopted RAIs in the United States, Northpointe “does not publicly disclose
the calculations used to arrive at defendants’ risk scores, so it is not possible
for either defendants or the public to see what might be driving the
disparity.”166
Northpointe shared some of the 137 factors included in its COMPAS
model with ProPublica, yet it did not share its weighting or specific
calculations.167 Interestingly, the survey asks defendants questions like:
‘Was one of your parents ever sent to jail or prison?’ ‘How many of your
friends/acquaintances are taking drugs illegally?’ and ‘How often did you
get in fights while at school?’ The questionnaire also asks people to agree

157. See infra Part II.
158. See infra Part III.
159. See infra Part II.B.3.
160. See infra Part I.C.1–2.
161. See infra Parts II.B.2, III.A.
162. See Case Management for Supervision, supra note 149.
163. See Angwin, supra note 39.
164. See id.
165. Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA
(May
23,
2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compasrecidivism-algorithm [https://perma.cc/98VZ-5K92]; see also Issie Lapowsky, One State’s
Bail Reform Exposes the Promise and Pitfalls of Tech-Driven Justice, WIRED (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.wired.com/story/bail-reform-tech-justice/ [https://perma.cc/VF8P-KS9Q]; All
Things Considered: The Hidden Discrimination of Criminal Risk-Assessment Scores (NPR
radio broadcast May 26, 2016) (stating that a system that calls black defendants high risk twice
as often as white defendants is not a fair one).
166. See Angwin, supra note 39.
167. See id.
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or disagree with statements such as ‘A hungry person has a right to steal’
and ‘If people make me angry or I lose my temper, I can be dangerous.’168

The usefulness of such questions, and the likely racially disparate outcomes
they produce, are concerning. Yet in State v. Loomis,169 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld the use of the COMPAS model in sentencing, while
finding that the corollary “risk scores may not be considered as the
determinative factor in deciding whether the offender can be supervised
safely and effectively in the community.”170 The court added that, if they
were considered as such, it “would raise due process challenges regarding
whether a defendant received an individualized sentence.”171 While different
constitutional protections may be afforded to individuals at sentencing and
pretrial detention,172 defendants are still severely crippled from challenging
the RAI’s determination where jurisdictions rely heavily on proprietary
models.
This is the key benefit of fully transparent nonprofit models. Whereas
proprietary models mirror judicial discretion in employing an unknown and
unchallengeable black box of assumptions and biases,173 open algorithms
allow individuals to know how a model views them and why a particular
score was reached.174 In 2017, the AI Now Institute issued a report
encouraging governments to “eschew ‘black box’ tools in favor of openness,
test appropriately for any bias and encourage staff with diverse backgrounds
and from various specialties to help develop and test the algorithms.”175 This
Note endorses this prescription because transparent models are far preferable
to closed algorithms which prevent policymakers, defendants, and judges
alike from fully understanding a given risk score.176
However, proprietary models are not all bad. The use of RAIs in parole
settings offers a useful analogy for actuarial bail determinations. Since 2012,
New York has used COMPAS scoring in parole decisions.177 Although
usually ignored by the parole board, COMPAS scores could provide benefits
and increased fairness to defendants.178 Parole boards, which can be filled
by inexperienced political appointees, regularly avoid letting anyone out of
prison who poses even the tiniest bit of unpredictability for fear of a
168. See id.
169. 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
170. See id. at 768.
171. Id. at 764 (“As the defense expert testified at the post-conviction motion hearing,
COMPAS is designed to assess group data. He explained that COMPAS can be analogized
to insurance actuarial risk assessments, which identify risk among groups of drivers and
allocate resources accordingly.”); see also infra Part II.A.
172. See Kehl et al., supra note 126, at 23 n.160.
173. See supra Part I.A.I.
174. See infra Part I.C.2.
175. See Rosenblum, supra note 146.
176. See infra Parts I.C.2, III.C.
177. Michael Winerip et al., For Blacks Facing Parole in New York State, Signs of a Broken
System, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/04/nyregion/newyork-prisons-inmates-parole-race.html [https://perma.cc/CBR9-9HCZ].
178. See id.
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publicized new offense, which can harm the political aspirations of their
appointers.179 In this context, even a proprietary RAI could provide political
cover, and some semblance of unbiased expertise, to inefficient, racist, and
overly punitive board decision-making.180 While proprietary RAIs can offer
some fairness benefits, if given the choice, legislatures should still implement
transparent models, which are far superior for all parties involved in pretrial
outcomes.181
2. Nonprofit Models
Perhaps the most widely adopted pretrial risk assessment tool is produced
by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation (“Arnold Foundation”), a
nonprofit organization with a partial focus on criminal justice reform.182 The
Arnold Foundation developed the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) as a
universal tool to analyze whether a person “will commit a new crime, commit
a new violent crime, or fail to return to court.”183 With a sample of
1.5 million cases from over 300 jurisdictions across the United States, the
PSA model has been applied to both front-end and back-end situations.184
While this universal application raises serious concerns,185 the model focuses
on limited static factors that may be the most desirable for pretrial RAIs.186
The PSA specifically ignores race, gender, education level, income level, and
zip code as explicit inputs.187 The Arnold Foundation claims that the model
has been adopted in over forty jurisdictions, including New Jersey,188
Kentucky, and Arizona.189
The PSA spits out a risk score between one and six, with six being the
highest risk that triggers a recommendation for remand. Yet, the model’s
website cautions that “[t]he decision about what to do always rests with the

179. Id. (“The board rarely released violent offenders of any race, denying nearly 90
percent of them at their initial interview.”); see also PFAFF, supra note 20, at 118.
180. See Winerip, supra note 177 (“[A]mong offenders imprisoned for more minor
felonies, the racial disparity is glaring. . . . Among male prisoners under 25 who had no prior
state prison sentences, the parole board released 30 percent of whites but only 14 percent of
blacks and Latinos.”).
181. See infra Part I.C.2.
182. See Pretrial Justice, supra note 148.
183. Id.; see also Kehl et al., supra note 126, at 13 (“[I]t has become increasingly common
to augment judicial decision-making with risk assessment software like Public Safety
Assessment in order to help reduce the number of individuals behind bars before trial without
increasing risk to the public.”); Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., Should Prison Sentences Be
Based on Crimes That Haven’t Been Committed Yet?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 4, 2015),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/prison-reform-risk-assessment/ [https://perma.cc/MWU2GPWZ] (“There is little question that well-designed risk assessment tools ‘work,’ in that they
predict behavior better than unaided expert opinion.”).
184. Pretrial Justice, supra note 148; see also infra Part II.B.3.
185. See infra Part II.B.3.
186. See supra Part I.C.
187. See supra Part I.C.
188. See infra Part II.C.
189. Pretrial Justice, supra note 148.
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judge.”190 New Jersey, for example, combines the PSA with other
considerations and flags defendants for rearrests upon pretrial release and
gun possession, among other factors.191 The benefit of nonprofit models is
they are rarely confidential, which provides public notice of which factors
matter to policymakers and affect defendants.192 This transparency is key
for any RAI because it offers defendants and their attorneys full knowledge
of the facts against them and allows the public and policymakers to compare
data over time to remedy emerging concerns regarding model outcomes.193
II. AMERICA’S NEXT BAIL MODEL: EVALUATING ACTUARIAL OUTCOMES
Regardless of whether bail is set using risk assessment instruments or
judicial discretion, an absolute lack of false positives and false negatives is
impossible. The real goal should be determining which alternative, or
combination of methods, is most beneficial to society, victims, and accused
individuals. It is critical to seek real and deliverable reform rather than
merely avoiding flawed models or frameworks without an alternative to the
profound injustices in modern pretrial detention. Besides the potential to
maintain, or exacerbate, the racial disparities in the incarcerated
population,194 the main theoretical criticism of risk assessment tools is that
they deprive defendants of an individualized assessment of their full history
and activity.195 Yet, this criticism is arguably a legal fiction.196
There is no question that criminal justice systems today result in
discrimination, unfairness, and often horrible dispositions.197 While
criticism for the sake of criticism may be useful for bringing awareness to
injustice, it does little to elicit real and practical solutions to the deficient
policies in place today. A blanket rejection of a reform can wrongly focus
on reaching perfect results rather than better results for those facing criminal
prosecution. Realizing that no policy will ever produce perfect results is
critical, and freeing, for policymakers to be able to experiment with necessary
system improvements.
Reformers must be sober-minded about what is politically, procedurally,
and financially possible. For example, in the RAI context, many fear that
actuarial models will maintain current pretrial racial disparities,198 and thus
RAI implementation should not be attempted. Yet, if racial disparity
190. Lapowsky, supra note 165 (quoting Leila Walsh, spokesperson for the Arnold
Foundation).
191. See infra Part II.C.
192. The Arnold Foundation was criticized for demanding confidentiality from
jurisdictions. The Foundation has apparently amended its policy to no longer require
confidentiality. See Tom Simonite, When Government Rules by Software, Citizens Are Left in
the Dark, WIRED (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/when-government-rulesby-software-citizens-are-left-in-the-dark/ [https://perma.cc/FX98-CXCP].
193. See infra Part II.D.2.
194. See infra Part II.B.2.
195. See infra Part II.A.
196. See infra Part II.A.
197. See supra Part I.B.2.
198. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.B.2.
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percentages are maintained while the overall incarcerated population is
reduced, this reduction is inarguably a better outcome than the status quo.
This Note attempts to cut through these criticisms by asking not only whether
models are better than judges at setting bail, but whether one is more
amenable to correction when discrimination and errors are identified.199 This
does not mean that better systems should be free from criticism.
Policymakers should always strive for improvements, especially where
technologies or evolving conceptions of equity and efficiency demand legal
permutations over time. Risk assessment tools can and do lead to disparate
outcomes. Under RAI regimes, people of color may continue to be
incarcerated at a higher rate than whites. But the great potential for improved
outcomes is, at least, worth considering.
In that endeavor, Part II.A identifies an oft-cited legal fiction,
“individualized assessment,” which arguably should not be used to block
RAI adoption. Part II.B outlines legitimate criticisms and concerns about
RAI adoption and Part II.C looks at the recent experience of RAI-based bail
reform in New Jersey. Part II.D assesses the capacities of both judges and
RAI designers to realize and correct inevitable biases and errors in their
approaches.
A. The Legal Fiction of Individualized Assessment
One perhaps overused phrase in the RAI debate is “individualized
suspicion,” or “individualized assessment.”200 The opponents of risk
assessment tools argue that algorithms infringe on the right to an
individualized assessment because they compare people to a model’s sample
average, rather than to their own personal conduct or past behavior.201 This
criticism makes sense in a vacuum. But the same concerns should arise when
considering the only current alternative: pure judicial decision-making.
Suspicion, after all, is itself a comparative concept. As humans, judges bring
their own biases and memories to the table, resulting in decisions based on a
defendant’s alleged behavior as compared to a judge’s past psychological
inputs and limitations, particularly their experience of other individuals. This
is what suspicion is built upon. Because no human assessment of another
person can ever be made without the lens of personal bias and comparison,
individualized assessment is, in reality, a legal fiction.202 In fact,
individualized assessment can only really exist if a computer determines a
defendant’s fate with a fully personalized set of inputs. This type of model
is not scalable or particularly useful as broad policy and may still inaccurately
predict a person’s future activity.
199. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 141.
200. See Oliver v. United States, 682 A.2d 186, 192 (D.C. 1996).
201. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 140. See generally State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749
(Wis. 2016).
202. Legal fictions, such as the idea of the “reasonable person,” are useful in law. But it is
important to be fair about criticizing actuarial models for not offering an individualized
assessment while leveling the same criticism against judicial discretion.
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Former Attorney General Eric Holder, when discussing the potential for
broad RAI adoption at a 2014 National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers conference, expressed this same popular concern about the lack of
individualized assessment:
I am concerned that [risk assessments] may inadvertently undermine our
efforts to ensure individualized and equal justice. By basing sentencing
decisions on static factors and immutable characteristics—like the
defendant’s education level, socioeconomic background, or
neighborhood—they may exacerbate unwarranted and unjust disparities
that are already far too common in our criminal justice system and in our
society.
Criminal sentences must be based on the facts, the law, the actual
crimes committed, the circumstances surrounding each individual case, and
the defendant’s history of criminal conduct. They should not be based on
unchangeable factors that a person cannot control, or on the possibility of
a future crime that has not taken place. Equal justice can only mean
individualized justice, with charges, convictions, and sentences befitting
the conduct of each defendant and the particular crime he or she
commits.203

His concerns about the discriminatory impact of many of these factors is
well-founded204 but basing these concerns on the need for individualized
assessment is misleading. Ideally, all those accused of crime could be
assessed in light of their own potential for flight, dangerousness, or
recidivism. But judges are not oracles. A person’s past behavior, compared
to how others have behaved in like circumstances, is exactly the type of
individualized assessment judges are expected to undertake.
Interestingly, there are certain aggregate or group traits courts can
appropriately consider and others they cannot. Juvenility, for example, is a
universal mitigating factor,205 while, conversely, homelessness or
joblessness is used as evidence of a lack of ties to the community in bail
determinations.206 These factors are only seen as relevant, for example,
when assessing flight risk because of societal assumptions about individuals
who do not have a home, a phone number, or a steady job. The assumptions
that follow from these factors are viewed as legitimate considerations for a
judge. However, they are not truly individualized—the lack of a contact
person means nothing about flight risk on an individual level.207 But
203. Eric H. Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal
Justice Network Conference (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-eric-holder-speaks-national-association-criminal-defense-lawyers-57th
[https://perma.cc/6D98-HM2F]; see also Horwitz, supra note 38.
204. See infra Part II.B.2.
205. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 233–34.
206. N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 2016, at 13–14 (2018),
https://www.nycja.org/lwdcms/doc-view.php?module=reports&module_id=1621&
doc_name=doc [https://perma.cc/MRB8-A96A].
207. This is one factor arraignment courts consider when setting bail in New York. See id.
at 13.
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generally, courts have determined that not having a person to contact
demonstrates a weak connection to the local community, and a higher
likelihood of flight risk, because of stereotypes about those who may be alone
or who may not want to list another individual.
Actuarial risk assessments and judges alike render decisions based on a
comparison to the average of their sample. For judges, that means a
comparison to all previous people before them, including family, friends,
neighbors, and defendants. For actuarial models, that means the average of
the selected sample population.208 Both activities are prone to human error
and inaccuracy,209 yet while one has more legitimacy in law today, the other
is likely more correctable once errors are identified.210
B. Artificial Unintelligence: The Limits of Actuarial Risk Assessment
With all their potential benefits, risk assessment instruments pose major
legal and practical challenges. Critics are right to fear the discriminatory
potential of RAIs,211 their implication for constitutional rights,212 and their
predilection for myopia.213 The most basic criticism, however, is that
actuarial models ignore factors that might have idiosyncratic value for certain
individuals.214 The ultimately false “broken leg” problem centers on the fact
that models can only see what humans tell them to see,215 not a surprise
broken leg that would prove a defendant could not have committed an act.216
Judges, this criticism claims, can consider such unique factors while models
cannot. This ability, however, is a “double-edged sword.”217 Judges are just
as likely to “rely on irrelevant factors or to include appropriate factors
incorrectly.”218 Evidence suggests that this flexibility in judicial discretion
ultimately does more harm than good.219 Yet, until RAIs are more broadly
tested, human observation and judicial discretion will still play a role in
model implementation.220
Before endorsing the limited usefulness of today’s RAI options, this Note
reviews potential obstacles and pitfalls to RAI adoption. Part II.B.1 analyzes
the constitutional and fundamental rights at stake when setting bail using
algorithms. Part II.B.2 explores the most vocal criticism of RAIs: that they
208. The sample population could, and should, change over time. See infra Part II.D.2.
209. See infra Part II.B.5.
210. While risk assessments are likely more “correctable,” they can be easily tuned to either
less or greater discrimination and incarceration. See infra Part II.D.2.
211. See infra Part II.B.2.
212. See infra Part II.B.1.
213. See infra Part II.B.4.
214. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 135.
215. See infra Part II.B.5.
216. PFAFF, supra note 20, at 135.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. (“For every case where the human sees the broken leg and makes a better call there
is more than one case in which the human takes into account something irrelevant that the
model ignores and thus reaches a worse conclusion.”).
220. See infra Part III.C.
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can maintain or exacerbate racial disparities in criminal justice systems. Part
II.B.3 explains that finding the right goals for pretrial RAIs is critical, yet
controversial. Part II.B.4 discusses the actuarial propensity for homing in on
the target population and thus becoming blind to surprise situations, while
Part II.B.5 notes that the most fundamental challenge for RAI efficacy is
ultimately human design.
1. Constitutional Rights at Stake
Pretrial deprivation of liberty creates due process and equal protection
concerns.221 To ensure due process, a judge who certifies such a deprivation
at arraignment must realize that “any system providing for pretrial detention
must be narrowly tailored to the compelling government interest put forward
to justify detention. Where that substantive requirement is met, a deprivation
of liberty must also reflect procedural safeguards designed to balance public
and private interests and to minimize the risk of error.”222 But when RAIs
play a large role in bail determinations, a violation of both substantive and
procedural due process may be hard to challenge, especially if algorithm
inputs and their weights are not publicly disclosed.223 In the pretrial context,
the Supreme Court has held that adequate procedural due process demands
procedures through which judicial officers can accurately evaluate the
potential for future dangerousness.224 This same conception of due process
should be reflected in decisions that incorporate flight-risk evaluations and
the use of RAIs in general. Thus, an individual must have the opportunity to
challenge potentially inaccurate or unfair risk assessment procedures if an
RAI is a determining factor in his incarceration.225
In addition to due process, the Equal Protection Clause proscribes the
deprivation of liberty before trial based on explicit immutable characteristics,
namely gender, race, and national origin.226 These classifications are
implicated in the inputs that inform actuarial risk assessments. Equal
protection demands that models never use these factors as overt inputs in
their analyses because they can lead to intentional (or facial) discrimination.
But the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid algorithms that
unintentionally cause disparate impact on these grounds, even if that impact

221. When models are proprietary or confidential they could implicate the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Defendants must be able to confront the witnesses offering
evidence against them. A hidden model thus prevents a person from hearing and challenging
the full set of facts against them. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
222. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 8; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302–03 (1993); United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749–51 (1987).
223. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing proprietary models).
224. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51.
225. There is currently little case law elaborating on what that pretrial challenge looks like,
but case law in other areas suggests some ways jurisdictions might ensure adequate
procedures. See generally State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
226. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208–09 (1976); Kehl
et al., supra note 126, at 19.

2018]

OPEN THE JAIL CELL DOORS, HAL

351

is predictable.227 Yet, such limited equal protection interpretations alone do
not determine policy. This Note explains that state and local policymakers
can, and should, find that disparate impact, while constitutional, must still be
avoided when building the best risk assessment tools possible.228
2. Discriminatory Factors
A risk assessment instrument is only as useful or discriminatory as the
inputs it considers. Humans are responsible for selecting what is included in
a model, and each additional factor can lead an algorithm down a different
and unpredictable road.229 Some factors explicitly track along racial, gender,
or socioeconomic lines.230 Others, such as prior criminal history,231 zip code,
or housing status, have a facially neutral description, but can maintain the
racial divisions in criminal justice systems.232 The usefulness and
discriminatory impact of each of these factors are subject to debate. And
while the use of these factors may be constitutional,233 they require careful
consideration and continued skepticism to avoid disparate impact in pretrial
incarceration.234
After all, even the best RAIs can create severe disparities along racial,
gender, or other demographic lines.235 To avoid continued or emboldened
discrimination in sentencing, Professor Sonja Starr argues against the use of
RAIs altogether.236 Starr explains, “[T]he socioeconomic and family
variables that [RAIs] do include are highly correlated with race, as is criminal
history, so they are likely to have a racially disparate impact.”237 Starr is
undoubtedly correct. However, these same concerns must apply to judicial
discretion in the bail context as well.

227. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 23.
228. For example, policymakers should seek to avoid adopting the notion of
colorblindness, which limits a realistic view of the disparate impact criminal justice policies
have on people of color. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS ch. 3 (2012); Elise C. Boddie, The Indignities
of Color Blindness, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCLOSURE 64 (2016); infra Part III.B.
229. See infra Part II.B.5.
230. However predictive a category might be, policymakers should also be aware of
labeling. For example, if gender is used as a factor, men might internalize that criminal
behavior is natural or expected from them, and that they deserve punishment. See PFAFF, supra
note 20, at 230–32.
231. See generally Hamilton, supra note 19.
232. See Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, & Recidivism:
Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 681 (2016) (explaining that
“[a]lthough race is omitted from these instruments, critics assert that risk factors that are
sometimes included (e.g., marital history and employment status) are ‘proxies’ for minority
race and poverty,” and thus risk assessments become discriminatory). See generally Sonja B.
Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66
STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014).
233. See supra Part II.B.1.
234. See infra Part III.B–C.
235. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 20.
236. Starr, supra note 232, at 806.
237. Id. at 838.
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The statutory factors a judge considers when fixing bail are equally
correlated with race.238 Yet, the difference, perhaps, is that risk assessment
factors systematize,239 and thus institutionalize, certain factors and their
repercussions as valid metrics and outcomes.240 That danger is real and must
remain ever present in the mind of RAI developers and adopters.241 Judges
are less susceptible to that replicable and systematic application of inputs,
and are perhaps able to craft a more full picture of the defendant’s
circumstances.242 Yet, while some model inputs can lead to maintaining the
inequalities of the status quo, such considerations likely lead to the same or
worse results under judicial discretion.243
Former Attorney General Holder speculates that RAIs could aggravate
current racial disparities,244 but, as others have predicted, risk assessment
tools could just as easily alleviate those disparities.245 These concerns about
RAIs are untested in a comparative sense, and judicial discretion must be met
with similar scrutiny.246 While discrimination may become enshrined in a
given instrument,247 the array of available risk assessment tools offers a
variety of ways to evaluate risk, to give different weights to inputs, and to
supplement criminal justice tasks, including fixing bail. Current models are
also not static or final—policymakers can continue to monitor and update
models as inefficiencies and disparate impacts are identified, a benefit not
available for judicial discretion en masse.248 The true benefit of using RAIs
is the relative ease with which data can be collected, outcomes evaluated, and
changes implemented.249
3. Goal-Limited Results: Front-End and Back-End Modeling
Modeling is employed on both the front end and back end of the criminal
justice system. Front-end modeling focuses on a person’s entrance into
criminal justice systems through sentencing, whereas back-end models deal
with a person’s ultimate release, parole, or recidivism.250 One RAI should
not be applied across the board; back-end and front-end models must weigh
different factors and must be tuned toward different goals.251 On the back
238. See id.
239. See infra Part II.B.4.
240. See Not in It for Money, supra note 15.
241. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 20.
242. See supra Part II.B.
243. See Janus & Prentky, supra note 41, at 1456–58. Contra Sophia Arakelyan, Artificial
Intelligence May Reflect the Unfair World We Live In, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 14, 2017),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/304467 [https://perma.cc/252R-T86C] (“AI systems
are being trained to reflect the general opinions, prejudices and assumptions of their
creators . . . .”).
244. See supra Part II.A.
245. Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 232, at 681.
246. See id. at 681–82.
247. See Not in It for Money, supra note 15.
248. See infra Part II.D.2.
249. See id.
250. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 138.
251. See id.
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end, reducing recidivism once a sentence is served is a useful goal,252
whereas on the front end, reducing flight risk or danger to society may be
more appropriate in the bail context.253 This Note argues that a presumption
of release should be the overarching goal of pretrial RAIs.254
While this Note focuses on the front-end use of pretrial modeling, a short
survey of how courts have viewed more prevalent back-end modeling
regimes is informative. In Loomis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the
use of RAIs in sentencing and delineated several due process
requirements.255 Most notably, the court held that “risk scores may not be
considered the determinative factor in deciding whether the offender can be
supervised safely and effectively in the community.”256 This stipulation may
be applicable on the front end as well, as the use of risk assessment tools
could be similarly limited before trial. The court in Loomis further held that
RAI determinations—particularly from proprietary algorithms—must be
accompanied by certain disclaimers for judges, including “that risk
assessment scores are based on group data and are able to identify groups of
high-risk offenders, not a particular high risk offender . . . and that risk
assessment tools must be constantly monitored and re-calibrated for accuracy
as the population changes.”257 As long as risk assessments, particularly those
that are proprietary and nontransparent, are not determinative, they can be
used as one piece of the judicial-discretion puzzle in Wisconsin’s sentencing
regime.258
The major challenge for adopting actuarial models across criminal justice
systems, however, is to not simply repurpose back-end tools for use on the
front end.259 Even on the back end, varying goals lead to different results.260
Starr argues that judges often use the wrong kind of tool in order to achieve
the results they desire.261 She criticizes current sentencing RAIs because
many focus on recidivism risk at the moment of conviction, not once the
sentence has been served.262 She posits that taking the effect of the imposed
sentence itself into account can provide more accurate and useful results.263
Actuarial models are thus only as useful as the goals they are designed to
achieve and the questions they are expected to answer.264 Professor John
Pfaff points out, for example, that “[t]ime spent in prison is relatively
unimportant for parole guidelines . . . but critical to sentencing tools.”265 The
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See Starr, supra note 232, at 861.
See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 138.
See infra Part III.A.
See generally State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
Id. at 760.
Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 24; see also Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 769.
See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 760.
See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 138–39.
Id.
See Starr, supra note 232, at 807.
See id. at 861.
PFAFF, supra note 20, at 140–41.
Id. at 141; infra Part III.A.
See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 141.
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solution, he explains, could simply be to “produce models that better
incorporate factors that [are] more relevant to front-end decision-making.”266
4. Tunnel Vision in Machine Learning: When Hyperfocus
Creates Blind Spots
Bernard Harcourt, in a book dedicated to critiquing the use of predictive
modeling in criminal justice systems, describes RAIs as self-defeating.267
His harsh rebuke of actuarial tools focuses on the idea that, if a rational
person is aware of the factors included in a risk assessment algorithm, she
may act in a way that avoids satisfying or exacerbating only those factors to
evade detection entirely.268 Put simply, if, for example, race is used as the
sole factor in a model, then people who meet that race classification will be
overtargeted and those who do not can completely avoid detection.269 The
picture is more complicated when there are multiple or even dozens of factors
in a model, but can still lead to the same avoidance behavior.
Absent the explicit use of race, a model may develop “tunnel vision” by
focusing more and more on defendants that meet a narrow set of factors, such
as income level, prior criminal history, and education level.270 But a
successful model cannot ignore those individuals who may be equally risky
due to unpredictable reasons.271 Left to their own devices, these RAIs could
then maintain or worsen current racial disparities in criminal justice
systems.272
In the bail context, where models rely more on past behavior than
immutable characteristics, this issue may be less prevalent than at sentencing
or parole. In the Arnold Foundation formula, for example, the included
factors focus on prior criminal history, violent criminal history, and prior
failures to appear.273 These predictors are inarguably less facially
discriminatory than the overt use of race or gender that Harcourt analyzes.
People, after all, should undoubtedly avoid being violent and building a
criminal record, and absent racist enforcement, these factors are useful for
assessing risk of flight or dangerousness to the community. Unfortunately,
our society is not without this troubling reality.274
Harcourt’s criticism is valid. The factors included can lead to selffulfilling prophesies that encourage actuarial models to develop myopia over
266. See id. (acknowledging the likely difficulty in designing such well-tuned models).
267. See id. at 136–37. See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION:
PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2006).
268. PFAFF, supra note 20, at 137–38.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 137.
271. Id. at 137–41.
272. See supra Part II.B.2.
273. See supra Part I.C.2.
274. Overenforcement of communities of color is a persistent problem across the United
States. This is a strong reason to avoid colorblindness in modern policymaking because, even
absent explicit racism, racist outcomes permeate current criminal justice systems and must be
accounted for in any RAI implementation. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 228.
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time as they evolve to identify what “type” of person tends to commit
crime.275 When this happens, even the legally fictitious notion of
individualized assessment becomes more attenuated. Yet accounting for the
likelihood of developing such tunnel vision through an algorithm’s own
proactive machine learning is critical for designing and maintaining useful
and fairer models.276 Most importantly, developers must realize that as a
model identifies the same types of people as high risk, then those who should
be detained before trial yet do not meet a narrow set of factors, could perhaps
evade the system more easily than if a judge’s intuition ruled the day.277 This
could result in more arrests and more crime at the same time.278
Further complicating this process, people do not fully comprehend how a
machine teaches itself.279 This should worry policymakers. But such an
actuarial tendency can also be monitored and corrected.280 While this Note
endorses the reserved use of RAIs, without a clear understanding of this
issue, policymakers should avoid RAI adoption altogether.281
5. Human Limitations Are Computer Limitations
As Ezekiel Edwards of the American Civil Liberties Union explains,
“Algorithms and predictive tools are only as good as the data that’s fed into
them . . . . Much of that data is created by man, and that data is infused with
bias.”282 Absent artificial intelligence (AI), computers can only process what
humans request. The selection of the goal and algorithm inputs is a human
process.283 Subsequent calculations are done perfectly by a machine, but
they can only produce what a limited human mind demands.
Critics may prefer clinical risk assessments to actuarial models but, as
William Grove and Paul Meehl point out, “[h]umans simply cannot assign
optimal weights to variables, and they are not consistent in applying their
own weights.”284 Janus and Prentky additionally argue that even weak
actuarial models produce better results than clinical decisions: “any
problems present in a poorly designed actuarial method are likely to be
equaled or exceeded in clinical assessments.”285 The difference between
clinical and actuarial assessments is usually “more one of computational

275. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 136–37.
276. See infra Part II.D.2.
277. Consider also that this may be a valid reason for proprietary or confidential
modeling—avoiding detection will be harder for individuals who no longer know exactly
which factors ultimately condemned them. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 136–37.
278. See id. at 137.
279. See Arakelyan, supra note 243.
280. See infra Part II.D.2.
281. See infra Part III.C.
282. See Lapowsky, supra note 165.
283. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 135.
284. See William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal
(Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures:
The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 315 (1996).
285. See Janus & Prentky, supra note 41, at 1458.
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power than of approach.”286 Yet, much like judges, RAI developers,
legislative committees, and implementing officials are subject to limited data
samples, expertise, and cognition that can poison an algorithm’s results, no
matter how careful the designer.287
C. Seeds of Reform in the Garden State
A noteworthy experiment to address the problems of overcrowded jails
and pretrial inequities is taking place in New Jersey.288 On January 2, 2017,
New Jersey implemented a plan that ended money bail statewide while
simultaneously adopting actuarial models to supplement—and heavily
influence—judicial decision-making.289 Met with skepticism by the public
defense community,290 and outrage among bondsmen,291 New Jersey pushed
forward with risk assessment tools and saw an almost 30 percent decline in
the jail population as of mid-2017.292
In 2014, former Governor Chris Christie, a Republican and previously a
federal prosecutor, backed the bail overhaul, working with the Democraticled legislature to place a controversial state constitutional amendment on the
ballot.293 Approved by 60 percent of voters, the amendment curbed the
universal right to bail by granting judges additional discretion to use
preventative detention for all defendants, not just those accused of a capital
offense.294 The only remaining limit on judicial discretion is the ability to
revoke bail for those who “if released: will not return to court; [pose] a threat
to the safety of another person or the community; or will obstruct or attempt

286. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 134.
287. See supra Parts I.A.1, II.B.5.
288. See Lisa W. Foderaro, New Jersey Alters Its Bail System and Upends Legal
Landscape, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/nyregion/newjersey-bail-system.html [https://perma.cc/S5VF-87VL]; see also Lapowsky, supra note 165
(calling New Jersey’s approach to reforming bail “perhaps the most audacious”); Ephrat Livni,
In the US, Some Criminal Court Judges Now Use Algorithms to Guide Decisions on Bail,
QUARTZ (Feb. 28, 2017), https://qz.com/920196/criminal-court-judges-in-new-jersey-nowuse-algorithms-to-guide-decisions-on-bail/ [https://perma.cc/964S-B6K2].
289. See Foderaro, supra note 288.
290. Letter from 5 Boro Defs. et al. to Andrew Cuomo, supra note 155.
291. Feuer, supra note 28 (“[T]he president of the Professional Bail Agents of the United
States, an industry trade group, issued what she called ‘A Declaration of War.’”).
292. All Things Considered: In New Jersey, Sweeping Reforms Deliver Existential Threat
to Bail Bonds Industry (NPR radio broadcast July 6, 2016).
293. See Matt Arco, Full Text of Christie’s 2017 State of the State, NJ.COM (Jan. 10, 2017),
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/01/read_full_text_of_christies_2017_state_of_the
_stat.html [https://perma.cc/6T47-7BKR] (“We now have a criminal justice system that . . .
release[s] those non-violent offenders who have only remained in jail because they are poor
and end the predatory bail system that has lobbyists roaming these halls advocating to keep
people behind bars unless their clients are permitted to profit from their release.”); Feuer,
supra note 28; Editorial, Gov. Christie Takes On the Bail Bondsmen, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/16/opinion/gov-christie-takes-on-the-bailbondsmen.html [https://perma.cc/3D5H-JZCT].
294. Stuart Rabner, Chief Justice: Bail Reform Puts N.J. at the Forefront of Fairness,
NJ.COM (Jan. 9, 2017, 10:32 AM), https://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2017/01/
nj_chief_justice_bail_reform_puts_nj_at_the_forefr.html [https://perma.cc/JTM5-GXZM].
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to obstruct the criminal justice process.”295 The amendment also granted the
legislature broad power to enact laws dealing with pretrial detention and
release.296 The unlikely political allies pushed the amendment to pave the
way for the 2014 Bail Reform and Speedy Trial Act.297 This layered and
multistep process required enormous trust that the legislature would not
develop overly harsh bail reforms, but rather work toward the stated goals of
decarceration, increasing fairness for defendants, and enacting policies
favoring remand for individuals that pose a risk of flight or dangerousness to
the community. The new law called for local officials to implement an RAI
to augment judicial discretion when setting bail.298
New Jersey partnered with the Arnold Foundation to develop its risk
assessment algorithm in order to intentionally avoid racialized factors.299
The new Public Safety Assessment assigns defendants a score from one to
six, six being the most “risky.”300 Scores are rendered within forty-eight
hours of arrest, but some judges push to complete the assessment within
twenty-four hours.301 It only takes pretrial services officers about two
minutes to produce a PSA score.302 The score is not dispositive; judges
recognize that the score does not tell the whole story and are still free to set
bail at their discretion.303 Yet, while bail is “still an option, . . . the reality is
that judges have nearly done away with it.”304 In the first month of adoption,
3382 cases were processed statewide and judges set bail in only three
instances.305 Judges held 283 defendants without bail because—in
combination with the PSA—they judged them high risk.306 By combining
both risk assessment tools and judicial discretion,307 the New Jersey Supreme
Court Chief Justice Stuart Rabner explains:
Most defendants will be released pretrial on a range of conditions that will
not include money bail. For low-risk defendants, the court may simply
direct an officer to send a text message or place a phone call to remind
defendants when they must appear in court. Defendants who pose greater
risks may be placed on electronic monitoring. Those considered a serious

295. S. Con. Res. 128, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2014).
296. See id.
297. See Foderaro, supra note 288.
298. See The Judiciary FY 2015–2016 Discussion Points, N.J. LEGIS. 3–4,
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/budget_2016/JUD_response.pdf [http://perma.cc/
62DY-G8QP].
299. See supra Part I.C.2.
300. See Foderaro, supra note 288.
301. Id.
302. Lapowsky, supra note 165.
303. Foderaro, supra note 288.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Judge Glenn A. Grant, Acting Admin. Dir. of the Courts, Remarks Before the New
Jersey Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee 4 (May 4, 2017),
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2017/SenateBudgetCommitteeRemarks_May_4_20
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3C8-8G3E].
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threat to public safety or risk of flight will be detained. Judges can also
modify conditions of release based on new circumstances.308

The reforms have produced stunning results. According to the New Jersey
Drug Policy Alliance, prior to the model’s adoption, “some 75 percent of
New Jersey’s jail population at any given moment was simply awaiting trial,
and 40 percent of jailed people were there because they couldn’t afford
$2,500 or less in bail. On average, people spent 10 months in jail before even
getting to trial.”309 A study of results from January 1 through March 31,
2017, the first three months of the program, showed that of the 10,193
defendants processed, preventive detention was ordered for 12.4 percent
(1262 people);310 74.3 percent (7579 people) were given pretrial release with
conditional programming;311 and 10.7 percent (1095 people) were released
on their own recognizance.312 In that time, bail was only set for eight
people.313 The fledgling system and scoring is managed by new statewide
pretrial services units.314
While statistics regarding the maintenance or expansion of race-based
disparities in pretrial detention are not yet available, one New Jersey judge is
cognizant of the very real potential for discrimination. “An effective risk
assessment must be gender and race neutral,” New Jersey Superior Court
Judge Ernest Caposela, one of the PSA’s early evangelists, explained.315
Decarceration has been so drastic in New Jersey that around five months
into the program, fearing the perception of overleniency, the Attorney
General issued new guidelines for prosecutors.316 Lobbyists for the police,
prosecutors, and bondsmen were particularly dismayed by a model factor
they felt was too weak or unaccounted for in the PSA: gun possession.317
Because the PSA is “trained on data from across the country, and because
some states have far more lax gun regulations . . . the PSA doesn’t consider
mere gun possession as an outsized risk.”318 After a well-publicized murder
308. Rabner, supra note 294; see also S. P. Sullivan, Here’s How Much N.J. Jail
Population Fell Since Bail Reform, NJ.COM (Aug. 23, 2017), http://www.nj.com/politics/
index.ssf/2017/07/njs_bail_population_dropped_20_percent_in_6_months.html
[https://perma.cc/4PJX-2VZN].
309. Lapowsky, supra note 165.
310. This accounts for “about 55% of the pretrial detention motions filed by prosecutors.”
Grant, supra note 307, at 4.
311. This “includ[es] regular reporting requirements and, in appropriate cases, home
detention or electronic monitoring.” Id. at 5.
312. See id. at 4. Note that the document’s listed statistics do not add up to 100 percent.
313. Id. at 5.
314. Id. at 4–5 (noting that the system also needs increased appropriated funding to be fully
implemented—right now it runs on the money produced from fees).
315. Lapowsky, supra note 165 (“The more risk factors you have, the less likely you’ll be
able to eliminate gender and racial bias.”).
316. Id.; see also Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen., Attorney General Strengthens
Bail Reform Directive to Better Ensure that Dangerous & Recidivist Criminals are Kept in
Jail Pending Trial (May 24, 2017), https://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases17/pr20170524c.html
[https://perma.cc/U6MS-BGMR].
317. Lapowsky, supra note 165.
318. Id.
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by a person deemed “low risk” by New Jersey’s PSA,319 the Attorney
General directed prosecutors to “push for detention more frequently in a
number of cases, such as for sex offenders, for people who commit crimes in
which a gun is used and for those with a history of being a threat to public
safety.”320 It is important to note that implementing an RAI is just one piece
of the bail reform effort in New Jersey.321 New Jersey has seen promising
results, but not every national implementation has been as successful.322 As
the experiment in New Jersey continues and new data becomes available,
various local stakeholders will likely continue to seek alterations to the broad
reforms.
D. Changing Hearts and Metrics
When error or inequality is identified in pretrial detention, RAIs can be
recalibrated much more easily than the built-in assumptions of all judges.
But this ease of correction comes with a converse problem: RAIs can just as
easily be tuned toward greater incarceration (and discrimination) depending
on who sets the current policy. Judges are idiosyncratic but, as a bloc, they
are at least relatively immune to changing political climates. They can
sometimes also be trained individually to compensate for any bias to which
they may be prone. As Part II.D.1 explains, regulating human prejudice is
possible, but difficult. Next, Part II.D.2 analyzes how adjusting algorithms
can be done quickly, but can just as easily be subject to abuse and the
unintended consequences of machine learning.323
1. Regulating Human Bias
When a 2007 report was released analyzing racial bias among referees in
the National Basketball Association (NBA),324 the league denied any such
misconduct.325 But the report was conclusive that the effect on the game was
319. Id.
320. Katherine Landergan, Months into New System, Attorney General Toughens N.J. Bail
Reform Rules, POLITICO (May 24, 2017), https://www.politico.com/states/newjersey/story/2017/05/24/months-into-new-system-attorney-general-revises-bail-reform-rules112311 [https://perma.cc/F3B6-L2T8]; see also S. P. Sullivan, N.J. Supreme Court Tightens
Bail Reform for Gun Crimes, Repeat Offenders, NJ.COM (May 25, 2017),
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/05/nj_supreme_court_tightens_bail_reform_rules
_for_gu.html [https://perma.cc/2MM4-ZCVU].
321. The elimination of money bail in New Jersey is perhaps the most important reform
that allows for successful RAI usage.
322. According to Human Rights Watch, for example “Harris County, Ohio, which uses
the Arnold Foundation risk assessment tool, has seen increased rates of pretrial detention and
increased rates of early guilty pleas.” Letter from John Raphling to Alexis Wilson Briggs &
Alec Karakatsanis, supra note 142.
323. See supra Part II.B.4.
324. Alan Schwarz, Study of N.B.A. Sees Racial Bias in Calling Fouls, N.Y. TIMES (May
2, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/02/sports/basketball/02refs.html [http://perma.cc/
FD89-DDC5].
325. Ira Boudway, NBA Refs Learned They Were Racist, and That Made Them Less Racist,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 7, 2014, 5:55 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0207/learning-they-were-racist-made-nba-referees-less-racist [https://perma.cc/E9XR-2HE6].
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“large enough so that the probability of a team winning is noticeably affected
by the racial composition of the refereeing crew assigned to the game.”326
Specifically, the report found that white referees called fouls against black
players at a greater rate than they did white players.327 Following major
publicity of the implicit bias in NBA refereeing since 2007,328 scholars
replicated the same study in 2014 and released the results with the title
“Awareness Reduces Racial Bias.”329 Researchers noticed a marked
improvement, writing that “racial bias completely disappeared.”330 They
concluded that the media attention and self-awareness of racial bias among
the referees must have led to a conscious effort to avoid discriminatory
calls.331
The same potential for self-correction and reduced implicit bias could be
possible for judges. As Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski explains, “[J]udges
seem to be aware of the potential for bias in themselves and possess the
cognitive skills necessary to avoid its influence.”332 With clear motivation
and the possible threat of being charged with bias, judges can compensate to
try to at least appear less biased.333 “Whether the judges engage their abilities
to avoid bias on a continual basis in their own courtrooms, however, is
unclear. . . . Control of implicit bias requires active, conscious control.”334
Absent the impetus to regularly self-correct, however, it seems unlikely
judges will significantly alter their behavior.335 Unfortunately, Rachlinski
adds that it is likely “judges are overconfident about their ability to avoid the
influence of race and hence fail to engage in corrective processes on all
occasions.”336
With training, constant effort, and regular pressure from outside observers,
judges can self-correct.337 But as Rachlinski notes, “[C]ourtrooms can be
busy places that do not afford judges the time necessary to engage the

326. Joseph Price & Justin Wolfers, Racial Discrimination Among NBA Referees, 125 Q.J.
ECON. 1859, 1885 (2010).
327. Schwarz, supra note 324 (finding that “black officials called fouls more frequently
against white players, though that tendency was not as strong”).
328. Id.
329. Devin G. Pope et al., Awareness Reduces Racial Bias 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 19,765, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19765.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N7M3-AZYD].
330. Id.; see also David Berri, What NBA Referees Can Teach Us About Overcoming
Prejudice, TIME (Dec. 16, 2014), http://time.com/3635839/implicit-bias-nba-referees/
[https://perma.cc/Z2RE-VNAH].
331. Pope et al., supra note 329, at 9 (explaining that “the evidence presented in this study
suggests that the most likely mechanism through which the change in bias occurred is that the
media reporting increased the awareness among referees about their own implicit racial bias
and that this awareness led to a reduction in such bias”).
332. Rachlinski et al., supra note 17, at 1225.
333. See id.
334. Id.
335. See id.
336. Id. at 1226. Such bias is also evident in sex-based disparities in adjudicative
outcomes. Id.
337. See id.
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corrective cognitive mechanisms that they seem to possess.”338 While public
shaming or awareness can lead judges to correct their behavior, it is unlikely
such correction will remain permanent.339 RAIs could possibly free up time
to afford judges the ability to moderate their own biases or offer an alternative
to exercising bias in the first place.
2. Tweaking Algorithms
The “surprise me” feature on music streaming services offers an apt
analogy for what may be needed to prevent actuarial models from becoming
so focused as to be self-defeating and inefficient.340 Like the algorithms that
monitor a user’s music preferences, RAIs can begin to identify which
combination of factors lead to the identification of high risk individuals and
allocate greater weight to the factors that appear to regularly matter.341 To
prevent the same track from playing on repeat, it is important to combat both
the self-reinforcement of models themselves and the adaptive behavior of
individuals by checking the actuarial model against a randomized sample.342
This can prevent the model from folding in on itself as it identifies the same
types of people as high risk.
To avoid a similar phenomenon in the tax realm, for example, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) has employed a special program used to correct its
auditing model which “identifies those who are generally paid in cash as
being more likely to evade their taxes. As the model starts to flag such
returns, auditors are likely to uncover more violations in such returns, which
in turn only emphasizes the need to audit more and more such returns.”343
But, as cash-only jobs are more closely scrutinized, other earners will evade
taxes at a greater rate, knowing they are not being watched.344 Thus the
model is no longer able to find “new evaders” outside the suspect type.345
Knowing this, the IRS has implemented the Taxpayer Compliance
Measurement Program (TCMP), “which randomly selects thousands of
returns for audit. By casting a wide net over all returns, the TCMP can detect
where malfeasance is moving . . . and it can update the [model]
accordingly.”346 Unfortunately, this means that the IRS audits many
innocent random people.347 But that randomness is necessary to prevent
model-reinforced biases from tainting the results. Using such a corrective
measure to improve RAIs could have the similarly negative consequence of
unnecessarily depriving individuals of liberty who would typically be
deemed “low risk.” Yet, while the model itself may produce results that harm
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Id. at 1225.
See id. at 1225–26.
See supra Part II.B.4.
See supra Part II.B.4.
See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 137.
This phenomenon is called the Discriminant Function. Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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some random individuals, final judicial oversight over any RAI
determination, as implemented in New Jersey, may alleviate this concern.348
Despite the possibility for this tunnel vision, and its attendant costs,
actuarial models offer easier data collection that can be assessed for errors
and impact as compared to judicial discretion. These metrics can be used to
identify gaps in the model and alter the factors, weights, and goals of an
algorithm to reach different results. This ease of attunement is impossible
under a regime of pure judicial discretion. Of course, changing a model may
require legislative action—a feat in itself—but RAIs open up at least the
opportunity for large-scale and uniform change. Admittedly, an impulsive
government could use this ease of attunement for ill, altering the pretrial
detention population almost immediately to suit a nefarious political agenda.
But regular data collection, testing, and the recording of risk scores provide
such an enormous benefit to policymakers and defendants alike that this fear
may be overridden. As a protective measure, legislatures could mandate that
any changes to a model require testing periods or other hurdles before
implementation. Despite the possibility of misuse, tweaking algorithms to
achieve pretrial release goals is far easier than regulating the intuitions and
biases of thousands of trial judges.349
III. PRETRIAL DECARCERATION: COMBINING THE BEST OF HUMAN
AND MACHINE POTENTIAL
The main challenge to RAI accuracy is its backwards-looking premise. All
behavioral analyses inevitably look to past conduct to draw conclusions
about the future. While the past is instructive, it cannot provide a perfectly
predictive map of future behavior, particularly for individual actors. Risk
assessments, however, attempt to do just that. While critics most fear
overreliance on an RAI’s errant and prophetic prescriptions, judicial
discretion is rarely met with the same criticism.350 Yet at arraignment, a
judge also has a set of formal and informal factors before her which she uses
to divine whether a defendant is likely to flee or pose some danger to the
community. The difference between the two options is that judges are not
regularly questioned about which factors they have found most compelling,
while transparent RAIs clearly show policymakers which, and how strongly,
factors are considered.
Models are subject to human inputs, which inevitably lead to error.351
They should perhaps also be subject to human review after implementation.
After all, judges have the added benefit of being able to include “broken leg”
situations that provide an extra layer of leniency, or harshness, to a model’s
determination.352 A healthy combination of judicial discretion and actuarial

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.D.1.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.5.
See supra Part II.B.
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accuracy is the best, albeit imperfect, way to reduce pretrial incarceration
rates today, while inhibiting pretrial injustices.353
First, Part III.A explains why a presumption of release is the ideal goal,
and first ingredient, for a successful pretrial risk assessment algorithm. Part
III.B then describes the types of factors which are most harmful and most
useful for model developers and policymakers to include in pretrial RAIs.
Finally, Part III.C cautions against a dogmatic reliance on RAI outcomes and
to instead embrace a limited, flexible, and sober view of RAI-based bail
reform.
A. A Presumption of Release: Setting the Right Pretrial Goal
“Catch and release is for fish not felons.”354 This sentiment has been
promulgated by those who fear the pretrial release of accused individuals.355
Yet this trite phraseology, an expression of tough-on-crime conservatism,
reveals an important point about the political difficulty of passing reform that
favors liberty rather than overincarceration. Reform requires immense
courage from lawmakers and the public alike to eschew modern preferences
for security over liberty in favor of trust and opportunity for accused
individuals.
Meaningful reform based on RAIs must be carried out intentionally and
carefully. RAIs employed at the very front end of criminal justice systems
must be tuned to the unique situation of defendants preconviction and
pretrial.356 To meet the aforementioned policy goal of reducing the
astronomical and unsustainable pretrial incarcerated population,357 a
presumption of release is necessary.358 The U.S. legal system aspires to be
one where a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Unfortunately,
U.S. legal tradition bends toward a system of incarceration until proven
guilty.359 To recalibrate the unjust and untenable status quo, people should
always be presumed innocent and should be shielded from incarceration
except in extreme cases of actual imminent dangerousness to others.360
A presumption of release will undoubtedly mean that some who may need
to be incarcerated, or rehabilitated, will be released to the public prior to
conviction, leading to a false negative. Some may flee a jurisdiction or
353. See supra Part II.C.
354. This phrase is seen on bumper stickers passed out by critics of increased pretrial
release in Kentucky. Alysia Santo, Kentucky’s Protracted Struggle to Get Rid of Bail,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/11/12/
kentucky-s-protracted-struggle-to-get-rid-of-bail [https://perma.cc/8HR4-RFJV].
355. Id.
356. See supra Part II.B.3.
357. See supra Part I.B.2.
358. See supra Part II.C.
359. See supra Part I.B.2.
360. This author believes that bail is only necessary where a person poses a real threat to
another individual. The very slim risk of flight any defendant poses is not proven to be a real
problem in criminal justice systems today. Dangerousness is also overstated and overused,
especially when other supervisory and restraining-order-type programming exists. See
RAHMAN, supra note 70, at 9.
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commit further crimes while awaiting trial. But that is a necessary risk to
take.361 The sustained horrors of current pretrial criminal justice systems and
their lasting impacts far surpass momentary and specific incidences of failure
or increased exposure to risk.362 Reform will require political courage in the
face of public anger at every “Willie Horton moment.”363 The public will
need a higher tolerance for their fellow humans who have merely been
accused of crime, trusting the system to make the best—not the perfect—
determinations of a defendant’s pretrial risk.364 Limited actuarial models,
with judicial oversight, can offer the best risk assessment outcomes available
today.
Custom models with separate goals for front-end and back-end processes
are necessary for maximum effectiveness and fairness.365 On the back end,
for example, reducing recidivism is a useful goal for sentencing.366 Before
trial, however, states have voiced the goals of reducing risk of flight or
preventing danger to society. The goal of release meets many more of the
modern policy aims legislators should seek. It reduces the jail population,
avoids the many documented false positives of the current system,367
prevents the collateral horrors of even limited exposure to modern jails,368
and maintains the United States’s aspirational presumption of innocence until
proof of guilt. Pretrial incarceration should truly be the very “limited
exception.”369
The goal chosen by policymakers also informs the initial selection and
weighing of factors included in a model.370 On the back end, for example,
youthfulness might be a useful reason to impose a shorter prison term
because people tend to age out of crime.371 On the front end, youthfulness
might be an aggravating reason to incarcerate someone before trial because
young people may be less likely to attend a court appearance or to understand
361. See supra Part I.B.2.
362. See Wiseman, supra note 30, at 420 & n.7; supra Part I.B.2.
363. Willie Horton, convicted of committing rape during a prison furlough, was famously
used in a fearmongering campaign to discredit George H. W. Bush’s Democratic rival,
Michael Dukakis, as weak on crime during the 1988 presidential election. See Schwartzapfel
& Keller, supra note 154; Editorial, Los Angeles Is Facing a Willie Horton Moment, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-blue-ribbon-publicsafety-20171030-story.html [https://perma.cc/8F7C-Q7WS].
364. See supra Part II.
365. See supra Part II.B.3.
366. But, as Starr points out, recidivism generally is not enough. Rather, the possibility for
recidivism after a sentence is served is most useful in the sentencing context. See Starr, supra
note 232, at 861.
367. Justin Rohrlich, Why Are There Up to 120,000 Innocent People in US Prisons?, VICE
NEWS (Nov. 10, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/why-are-there-up-to-120000-innocentpeople-in-us-prisons [https://perma.cc/2UBY-CJ5E].
368. See Wiseman, supra note 30, at 419–20; Neufeld, supra note 104. See generally
Dobbie et al., supra note 104.
369. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
370. See David G. Robinson, The Challenges of Prediction: Lessons from Criminal
Justice, 14 I/S (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 23–25) (describing the importance of goal
setting to improving criminal justice outcomes).
371. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 209.
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the seriousness of the charge against them.372 A well-defined policy goal for
RAIs is the cornerstone of an effective pretrial criminal justice regime.373 Of
course, policymakers will believe in different theories of punishment or goals
for criminal justice.374 But they must come to a clear agreement of even an
overarching goal to begin to build the best model possible. A presumption
of release should be that goal.
B. Humanizing Algorithms
“Models are excellent at assessing how relevant various factors are, but
they have a much harder time detecting what factors matter in the first
place.”375 At least today, humans are better at identifying what matters.376
Better, however, does not mean perfect; humans can never understand the
full impact of a chosen factor on a model, but, absent full AI, algorithms
simply cannot make that initial decision.377 Policymakers and legislators, as
elected officials in a representative democracy, should theoretically be the
most capable of selecting the factors that society believes are instructive for
reaching the goal of release and decarceration.378
In selecting RAI inputs, it is first important to keep the goal of pretrial
release in mind.379 Next, policymakers must identify which factors inform a
determination in favor of that goal, all while maintaining clarity, fairness,
and a sober realization that human error and bias inform many of the factors
considered.380 With the help of experts, local policymakers should make the
determination of which factors are included in their own models, subject to
regular revision. Yet there are a few factors that should be ignored in every
instance. Race and gender must be avoided as model inputs altogether
because they are facially discriminatory.381 Likewise, factors that track
along racial lines (such as income level or zip code), which may only exist
as predictive factors because of overenforcement in neighborhoods of color,
should also be precluded from any model.382
Common bail factors such as crime severity, weight of the evidence, or
strength of the case are also suspect because they presume guilt prior to trial
or conviction. A completely innocent person is equally innocent whether
372. These are theoretical differentiations rather than recommendations. This author does
not believe age is a relevant factor for pretrial RAIs.
373. See supra Part II.B.3.
374. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 37.
375. Id. at 135.
376. Id.
377. See supra Part II.B.
378. See supra Part I.B.3.
379. See supra Part III.A.
380. See Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The Influence of Criminal History on Risk
Assessments, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75, 108 (2015).
381. See supra Part II.B.2.
382. See Hamilton, supra note 380, at 90 (“In forensic terms, criminal history is most often
considered a static risk factor. But Michael Tonry more appropriately describes criminal
history as a ‘variable marker,’ which he describes as a fixed characteristic that may be subject
to change.”).
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they are accused of first-degree murder or turnstile jumping. Without a
conviction, it is very dangerous for a model to make assumptions about a
person based on what they are merely accused of. Note that this limitation is
recommended for RAI factors themselves, not the entire final bail
determination. Judges should still have the final say on the risk posed by an
individual to take more intuitive or idiosyncratic factors into account on a
limited basis.
Prior court attendance record or number of past bench warrants issued are
useful factors for a model focused on preventing risk of flight. For a firsttime defendant, release would thus be heavily favored. Models focused on
dangerousness to society may want to look at prior recent violent crime
convictions, recent domestic violence record, and history of restraining
orders.383 Considering the amount of time between any prior convictions and
the current alleged offense is useful as people may be rehabilitated or age out
of crime and should perhaps receive a renewed presumption of low risk
without the baggage of long-ago offenses.384 An individual’s financial
situation should not be an included factor for two reasons: (1) it often leads
to racially disparate impact, and (2) money bail should be abolished entirely
(as tried in New Jersey) as it only provides an avenue for liberty to those who
can afford it.385
These are only the tip of the iceberg of potential inputs, but overall,
policymakers should avoid including factors that: (1) are overtly race- or
gender-based; (2) are implicitly race- or gender-based; (3) are otherwise
discriminatory; or (4) are based on long-past criminal behavior, particularly
drug abuse,386 for which they have already been punished or rehabilitated.
RAIs should be equipped with metrics targeting limited static factors specific
to preventing flight or dangerousness within the overall goal of presuming
release.387 This effort will certainly result in false negatives where some
people who do pose a real risk of flight or dangerousness to society will be
released. However, reducing the pretrial deprivation of liberty is a
worthwhile risk to take in the face of a far worse status quo.388
C. Preventing Actuarial Models from Becoming Self-Aware
Deprivation of the fundamental right to liberty is so serious that legislators
and policymakers must understand the potential for algorithmic results to
gain an exalted presence in society. Left unchecked, machine learning can
ultimately erode shared national goals of justice, fairness, and liberty. These
383. See supra Part II.B.2.
384. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 209.
385. See supra Part II.C. Yet, if jurisdictions do not do away with money bail, considering
an individual’s financial situation may encourage judges to reduce bail to amounts indigent
defendants can afford.
386. See Dewan, supra note 37.
387. See supra Parts II.B.2, III.A.
388. See Neufeld, supra note 104 (“Public officials have a social responsibility to pursue
the opportunities that algorithms present, but to do so thoughtfully and rigorously. That is a
hard balance, but the stakes are too high not to try.”); see also supra Part I.B.2.

2018]

OPEN THE JAIL CELL DOORS, HAL

367

goals can themselves be contradictory, but ultimately people must turn from
blind tough-on-crime dogma toward mutual trust and a presumption of
release to achieve these national aspirations. RAIs can help to reform bail in
favor of these goals, but they can also lead to overreliance and deference,389
a further institutionalization of racism,390 and judicial laziness.
When implementing actuarial models to determine a person’s pretrial
liberty, policymakers should maintain a healthy understanding of sciencefiction-sounding, but legitimate, concerns. To that end, models must be
viewed with healthy and regular skepticism. Overreliance on metrics and
institutionalized factors can lead to stale and self-defeating models.391
People also tend to trust outcomes, even discriminatory ones, when produced
by complex models and data.392 As a baseline, this trust can be a foundation
for further bias and discriminatory practices, ultimately leading to the
dangerous and institutionalized labeling of certain groups.393
Critics rightly challenge that “while judges may rely on impermissible
factors, it may be less harmful for judges to use them less accurately but less
explicitly.”394 The labeling of certain groups as more risky or dangerous,
especially by a seemingly trustworthy mathematical model, can lead to
unintended associations and stereotypes.395 This is a key reason this Note
demands RAI transparency and avoidance of the explicit use of race and
gender as inputs. Likewise, it is key to avoid factors that track along racial
lines and to compensate for disparate enforcement in certain communities.396
Criminal justice systems today, and judicial discretion in particular, often
identify communities of color with factors such as lower education levels,
certain zip codes, criminal history, and violence.397 Models will likely do so
as well,398 but they also offer an opportunity to avoid these undetectable
implicit biases in judges and to choose factors, and weights, that specifically
seek to avoid racial disparities and the colorblindness trap.399
Artificial intelligence is unfortunately prone to upholding the inequalities
it sees in the world.400 Yet, AI developers can identify this tendency and
address it via new programming.401 Awareness of the problem can lead to
the intentional design of RAIs that strive for the world as it should be rather
389. See generally Robinson, supra note 370.
390. See supra Part II.B.2.
391. See supra Part II.D.2.
392. See Robinson, supra note 370, at 32 (“Whenever government grounds its exercise of
power in a statistical model, the patterns that are reflected in the input data will become part
of the state’s vision of reality.”).
393. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 139 (“For example, while men are more likely to commit
crimes than women, most men will not commit crimes. But including ‘male’ as a risk factor
could encourage people to view all men as risky.”).
394. See id. at 140.
395. See id. at 139.
396. See supra Part II.B.2.
397. See id.
398. See Arakelyan, supra note 243.
399. See generally Boddie, supra note 228.
400. See Arakelyan, supra note 243.
401. Id.
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than the world as it is. Of course, this progress demands legislators,
policymakers, and judges who are accepting of such technological and
philosophical concerns. Rather, we often see inability, laziness, and shortterm thinking among policymakers who may simply defer to the first iteration
of an RAI and call it a day and ignore continuing disparities in pretrial
detention.402 RAIs have great potential to improve modern criminal justice
systems, but their misuse and abuse can lead to much worse carceral
outcomes than exist today.403 If implemented, it is incumbent upon all
criminal justice stakeholders to continually challenge and improve RAI
design and implementation.
CONCLUSION
The current popularity of bail reform efforts has led to a spirited debate
over the efficacy of implementing risk assessment instruments to improve
pretrial outcomes for defendants.404 This interest is premised on the fact that
there is something particularly wrong with incarcerating individuals before a
finding of guilt. Actuarial tools can provide increased efficiency, uniformity,
and fairness that the status quo of judicial discretion sorely lacks.405 While
some reformers fear RAI usage and its potential for discrimination, they often
fail to admit that judicial discretion offers at least the same, and often far
worse, outcomes for defendants. Ultimately, “[g]iven the courts’ routine
reliance on clinical risk assessment to support long-term liberty deprivation,
it is illogical to exclude demonstrably more reliable . . . tools.”406 RAIs also
allow for improved data collection to more easily identify inequities and
errors in pretrial detention.
In all, RAIs provide pretrial regimes with renewed reliability outside the
black box of judicial discretion. However, RAIs should never be adopted
absent specific safeguards.407 Without full transparency, regular validation,
and the pretrial goal of a presumption of release, RAIs will likely do much
more harm than good by exacerbating the racial inequalities in the current
unacceptable status quo and even increasing the already massive jail
population.408 A careful implementation of RAIs can help reduce current
incarceration levels and improve criminal justice outcomes. As the title of
this Note suggests, however, algorithmic determinations—as they operate
today—should never have the final say in an individual’s pretrial detention.
402. See supra Part I.B.2.
403. This is why the court in Loomis required careful instructions for their use. See supra
Part II.B.3.
404. See supra Part I.B.3.
405. See supra Part I.B.2.
406. See Janus & Prentky, supra note 41, at 1459.
407. See supra Part III.B.
408. Bärí A. Williams, Opinion, ‘Intelligent’ Policing and My Innocent Children, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/02/opinion/sunday/intelligentpolicing-and-my-innocent-children.html [https://perma.cc/9KUZ-S9F7] (“[B]iases will be
built into the foundation of many ‘intelligent’ systems shaping how we live. . . . There are
ways to make A.I. work. But . . . it must be thoroughly tested and proven not to
disproportionately harm communities of color.”).
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Like the notorious HAL from the film 2001: A Space Odyssey, RAIs can
be an important advancement in criminal justice reform, yet humans must
maintain a healthy awareness of their potential to become overtrusted or more
powerful than anticipated.409 Actuarial risk assessment tools can only
provide a map toward decarceration. For now, well-trained and informed
judges must still navigate individual defendants through the critical pretrial
moment, which sets the stage for all future interactions with criminal justice
systems.

409. Petitioning the self-aware robot HAL to let him back into the spacecraft, the movie’s
main character, Dave, demands, “Open the pod bay doors, HAL,” to no avail. See 2001: A
SPACE ODYSSEY (Stanley Kubrick Productions 1968).

